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Notes
EXPANDING THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION TO THE
EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE: BORSE v. PIECE
GOODS SHOP, INC.
I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning in the late 1800s, the employment-at-will doctrine has
secured a stronghold in the American legal system. The doctrine per-
mits an employer to discharge an at-will employee without liability for a
good reason, a bad reason or no reason at all.2 In the past fifteen years,
however, courts have limited an employer's ability to dismiss an at-will
employee by developing exceptions to the doctrine.3 For example,
1. See Cornelius J. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding the De-
velopment of the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 WASH. L. REv. 719 (1991) (surveying
origin and development of employment-at-will doctrine, and examining how
courts have dealt with doctrine's declining acceptance). The employment-at-will
doctrine is purely an American creation. Id. at 721. It is thought that Horace
Wood first developed the theory in his 1877 treatise on the law of master and
servant. Id. at 722. In his treatise, Wood stated that:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima
fade a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly
hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so
much a day, week, month or year, no time being specified, is an indefi-
nite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but
only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may serve.
Id. (quoting HORACE WOOD, LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 272 (1877)).
This theory soon grew in acceptance as being "well suited to employer
needs in America's developing industrial and commercial society." Id.; see also
Darlington v. General Elec., 504 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) ("There is
little question that the rationale for the prevailing rule was based on the assump-
tion that it was necessary to preserve managerial discretion in the workplace and
to maintain freedom of contract.").
While the Restatement of Contracts did not include the employment-at-will
doctrine, the United States Supreme Court endorsed the doctrine in Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) and Adair v. Unites States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908). Peck,
supra, at 723. Consequently, the doctrine's acceptance was subsequently viewed
as a well-settled principle in American employment law. For a further discussion
of the origins of the doctrine, see Madelyn C. Squire, The Prima Fade Tort Doctrine
and a SocialJustice Theory: Are They a Response to the Employment At-Will Rule?, 51 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 641 (1990).
2. See HenryJ. Perritt, Jr., The Future of Wrongful Dismissal Claims: Where does
Employer Self Interest Lie?, 58 CINN. L. REV. 397, 397 n.1 (1989). Today, the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine takes the form of a presumption that all employees are
at-will employees. Id. An employee can rebut this presumption by providing
evidence of a contractual provision providing otherwise, by demonstrating a vio-
lation of a common-law doctrine or by showing a statutory violation. Id. For a
discussion of the at-will presumption in Pennsylvania, see infra note 62.
3. See Mark R. Kramer, Comment, The Role of Federal Courts in Changing State
(1527)
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under the public policy exception, an employer may incur liability for
dismissing an at-will employee if the dismissal violates a recognized and
significant public policy. 4
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court first suggested that Pennsylvania
law might recognize a wrongful discharge action based on a public pol-
icy violation in Geary v. United States Steel Corp. 5 Interpreting Geary as en-
dorsing the public policy exception, federal and lower state courts in
Pennsylvania gradually expanded the exception's scope.6 Borse v. Piece
Goods Shop7 is among the Third Circuit's most recent applications of the
public policy exception under Pennsylvania law.8 In Borse, the Third
Law: The Employment At Will Doctrine in Pennsylvania, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 227, 245-
47 (1984).
Commentators have grouped wrongful discharge actions into three general
categories: "(1) public policy, (2) implied contract and (3) implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. Squire, supra note 1, at 642 n.4; see also Perritt, supra
note 2, at 398-99 (labeling three categories of actions as implied-in-fact contract
theory, public policy tort theory and covenant theory).
4. See Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119, 120 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1978) ("[O]ur Supreme Court has indicated that where a clear mandate of pub-
lic policy is violated by the termination, the employer's right to discharge may be
circumscribed.").
5. 319 A.2d 174, 180 (Pa. 1974). Geary was the first Pennsylvania Supreme
Court decision to consider the validity of a public policy exception to the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine. Id at 175. The Geary court held that while situations
may arise in which public policy is threatened, as long as the employer has a
legitimate reason for dismissing the employee, there is no cause of action for
wrongful discharge. Id. at 180. For a further discussion of Geary, see infra notes
66-69 and accompanying text.
6. See Woodson v. AMF Leisureland Ctrs., Inc., 842 F.2d 699, 702-03 (3d
Cir. 1988) (finding public policy violation where employer dismissed employee
for refusing to serve alcohol to person employee reasonably believed was intoxi-
cated); Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363, 1365 (3d Cir.
1979) (finding public policy violation where employee was dismissed for refus-
ing to submit to polygraph test); Shaw v. Russell Trucking Line, Inc., 542 F.
Supp. 776, 779 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (finding public policy violation where employee
was dismissed for reporting traffic violations); McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F.
Supp. 1111, 1119 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (finding public policy violation where em-
ployee was dismissed after refusing to violate anti-trust laws); Field v. Philadel-
phia Elec. Co., 565 A.2d 1170, 1180 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (finding public policy
violation where employee was dismissed for "perform[ing] a duty he was re-
quired to perform under federal law"); Hunter v. Port Auth., 419 A.2d 631, 638
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (finding public policy violation where employer denied
employment to individual due to prior conviction that was subsequently
pardoned); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119, 120 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1978) (finding public policy against firing employee for attending jury duty).
7. 963 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1992). Subsequent to the Third Circuit's deci-
sion, the plaintiff filed a petition for a rehearing before the full panel. Id. at 626.
However, this petition was denied. Id.
8. Since Borse, the Third Circuit has examined the public policy exception
on one other occasion. See Clark v. Modem Group Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 332 (3d Cir.
1993) (holding that employee does not state wrongful discharge action after be-
ing terminated for refusing to follow employer's instruction that employee rea-
sonably, but erroneously, believed violated the law).
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Circuit held that dismissing an at-will employee for failing to c6nsent to
an urinalysis drug screening and personal property search may violate
Pennsylvania's public policy against the tortious invasion of an em-
ployee's privacy.9 To ascertain whether the employer's drug testing
program tortiously invades an employee's privacy, the court must first
determine whether the drug testing program is highly offensive to a rea-
sonable person.' 0 This is accomplished by balancing the employee's
privacy interest in refusing to participate in the program against the em-
ployer's interest in maintaining a drug free workplace. I I If the court
determines that the program is highly offensive and thus tortiously in-
vades the employee's privacy, an employee who is discharged for refus-
ing to participate in an urinalysis drug testing program can sustain a
wrongful discharge action against his or her employer.12
This Note examines the Third Circuit's decision in Borse and its im-
pact on the employment-at-will doctrine in Pennsylvania, Section II
surveys the development of the public policy exception and examines
various approaches to the doctrine taken by courts around the coun-
try. 13 Section III surveys the evolution of the employment-at-will doc-
trine under Pennsylvania law in both the Pennsylvania state courts and
the Third Circuit, focusing on the development of the public policy ex-
ception, the parameters of the exception and the possible sources of
public policy.' 4 Section IV examines the privacy issues implicated in
urinalysis screening and drug testing programs. 15 Section V examines
the Third Circuit's analysis and conclusions in Borse. 16 Finally, Section
VI of this Note discusses the impact the Borse decision is likely to have on
an employer's decision to initiate a drug testing program and attempts
to establish guidelines for Pennsylvania employers who choose to de-
9. Borse, 963 F.2d at 623. The Borse court held that "[i]f the [Pennsylvania
Supreme Court] determined that the discharge was related to a substantial and
highly offensive invasion of the employee's privacy, we believe that it would con-
clude that the discharge violated public policy." Id. For a further discussion of
the court's holding in Borse, see infra notes 226-326 and accompanying text.
10. Borse, 963 F.2d at 627.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 623, 627.
13. For a discussion of the various approaches to the public policy excep-
tion, see infra notes 32-61 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the evolution of the public policy exception under
Pennsylvania law, see infra notes 62-195 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of urinalysis drug testing and other privacy issues, see
infra notes 196-225 and accompanying text.
This Note specifically addresses the problems raised by drug testing in the
workplace. While Piece Goods Shop's program included personal property
searches, the Borse court noted that identical issues are implicated by the pro-
gram's separate aspects. Borse, 963 F.2d at 623. Therefore, this Note will not
address the issues implicated in personal property searches by private
employers.
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velop a drug testing program. 17
II. THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE AND THE PUBLIC POLICY
EXCEPTION: DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
One of the most significant developments in employment law in the
past thirty years has been the gradual erosion of the employment-at-will
doctrine.' 8 While most states continue to recognize the employer's
power to discharge at will, exceptions developed by the courts and legis-
latures have limited the doctrine's effectiveness.19 Almost all states now
recognize at least one common-law action impeding an employer's
power of discharge. 20 Among the common-law doctrines utilized by
courts include the theories of implied contract, implied covenant and
the public policy exception. 21
The public policy exception was first articulated in 1959 by the Cali-
fornia Appellate Court in Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Team-
sters.22 The employee in Petermann claimed that his employer discharged
him for refusing to commit perjury before a state legislative commit-
tee.23 While the Petermann court recognized the employee's at-will em-
ployment status, it nevertheless stated that the "right to discharge an
[at-will employee] may be limited by statute or by considerations of pu-
bic policy." 24 Because of the doctrine's firm position in American law,
17. For a discussion of the impact of the Borse decision, see infra notes 302-
26 and accompanying text.
18. Most commentators who have written on the topic of the employment-
at-will doctrine agree as to this point. See, e.g., Kurt H. Decker, At-Will Employ-
ment in Pennsylvania-A Proposal For Its Abolition And Statutory Regulation, 87 DICK.
L. REV. 477, 482-86 (1983); Perritt, supra note 2, at 397.
19. See PAUL I. WEINER, WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIMS-A PREVENTIVE AP-
PROACH 10 (1986) (noting that while exceptions restrict employer's power of
discharge, they do not restrict general applicability of employment-at-will
doctrine).
20. See HENRY H. PERRrIT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE§§ 1.13-1.63 (3d ed. 1992) (surveyingjurisdictions that recognize exceptions to
employment-at-will doctrine).
21. One commentator noted the different theories inherent in each of the
doctrines. For instance:
Implied contract exceptions show the courts' uneasiness with the
notion that express representations ofjob security must be linked to an
agreed duration of employment in order to be enforceable, or that em-
ployment agreements are so inherently different from other types of
agreements that they should not import the same duty of good faith
and fair dealing imposed by custom or statute in other commercial
relationships.
Arthur S. Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment Termination, 66 N.C. L. REV.
631, 648 (1987-88).
22. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. App. 1959).
23. Id. at 26.
24. Id. at 27 (citations omitted). In finding a violation of public policy, the
Petermann court defined public policy as "that principle of law which holds that
no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public
1530 [Vol. 38: p. 1527
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 5 [1993], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol38/iss5/4
1993] NoTE 1531
however, Petermann was not viewed as creating a general exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine.
25
It was not until Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. 2 6 that a court judicially
extended a general limitation over the employer's power to discharge.
2 7
In Monge, the plaintiff was discharged after refusing sexual advances
from her manager.2 8 In restricting the employment-at-will doctrine, the
New Hampshire Supreme Court opined that no economic or social ben-
efit results from the discharge of an at-will employee when the discharge
is "motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation."'29 Al-
lowing a wrongful discharge action in these circumstances provides sta-
bility to the employee while allowing the employer to retain his normal
freedom to discharge an employee when economics and efficiency re-
quire such a dismissal.a0 Since Monge, at least forty-three states have
either judicially or legislatively recognized the public policy exception.31
or against the public good." Id. (citing Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks Interna-
tional Ass'n, 261 P.2d 721, 726 (Cal. 1953)). Recognizing that perjury is unlaw-
ful and interferes with the proper administration ofjustice, the court held that
"in order to more fully effectuate the state's declared policy against perjury, the
civil law, too, must deny the employer his generally unlimited right to discharge
an employee." Id The court concluded that any impediment to the encourage-
ment of truthful testimony must be struck down. Id.
25. Peck, supra note 1, at 723-24 & n.24 (noting that only two law review
articles mentioned case year following decision).
26. 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
27. Peck, supra note 1, at 724.
Prior to Monge, the Indiana Supreme Court, in 1973, also allowed a wrong-
ful discharge claim in Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425
(Ind. 1973). In Frampton, the plaintiffwas fired for filing a workman's compensa-
tion claim. Id at 428. In upholding the plaintiff's cause of action the court
recognized the need to protect an individual's exercise of statutorily conferred
rights. Id.
28. 316 A.2d at 550.
29. Id. at 551. In creating this new remedy, the court noted that all employ-
ment contracts involve balancing "the employer's interests in running his busi-
ness ... against the interest of the employee in maintaining his employment,
and the public's interest in maintaining a proper balance between the two." Id.
The court held that terminations motivated by bad faith or malice or based on
retaliation are not in the best interests of the public and constitute a breach of
the employment contract. Id
30. Id at 552.
31. PERRr, supra note 20. Several states however, refuse to recognize the
public policy exception. Among these states are New York, Maine, Alabama,
Louisiana and Mississippi. There are various reasons why these courts have re-
fused to apply the public policy tort. For instance, in Murphy v. American Home
Products Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983), the New York Supreme Court held
that the legislature must initiate any deviations from the employment-at-will
rule. Id. at 89-90. The Murphy court reasoned that the:
Legislature has infinitely greater resources and procedural means to
discern the public will, to examine the variety of pertinent considera-
tions, to elicit the views of the various segments of the community that
would be directly affected and in any event critically interested, and to
investigate and anticipate the impact of imposition of such liability.
5
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When applying the public policy exception, courts are confronted
with two central questions.3 2 First, a court must determine whether the
employee's discharge violates or threatens a particular public policy. 33
The court may derive the public policy from one of a number of sources,
including statutes, constitutions, administrative regulations, profes-
sional standards or the common law.8 4 Second, a court must determine
whether a violation of that policy by terminating an employee justifies an
employee's recovery for wrongful discharge.3 5 Generally, in answering
these questions, courts have either broadly or narrowly defined the pub-
lic policy exception.3 6 Courts that broadly define the exception look to
Id The court envisioned a "principled statutory scheme" that adequately bal-
ances the competing interests involved and that can be applied only prospec-
tively. Id at 90. Other courts have given little or no reason for their rejection of
the doctrine. See, e.g., Gil v. Metal Serv. Corp., 412 So. 2d 706, 708 (La. Ct. App.
1984) (refusing to recognize doctrine when employee terminated for refusing to
violate law); Bard v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 590 A.2d 152, 156 (Maine 1991)
(stating that Maine has not yet recognized wrongful discharge action).
32. This is the general approach taken by the Pennsylvania Superior
Courts. See Cisco v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 476 A.2d 1340, 1343 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1984) (utilizing two-part test in applying public policy exception).
33. See Cisco, 476 A.2d at 1343; Squire, supra note 1, at 642 n.4 (stating that
employee, as part of his or her prima facie case, must show violation of "clear
mandate" of public policy). Courts differ as to the strength of the public policy
required. Pennsylvania requires a violation of a "clearly mandated public policy
which 'strikes at the heart of a citizen's social rights, duties, and responsibili-
ties.' " Turner v. Letterkenny Fed. Credit Union, 505 A.2d 259, 261 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1985) (quoting Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 721 F.2d 894, 899 (3d
Cir. 1983)).
34. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J.
1980). In Pierce, the NewJersey Supreme Court listed the possible sources of the
public policy, including "legislation; administrative rules, regulations or deci-
sions; and judicial decision. In certain [situations], a professional code of ethics
may contain an expression of public policy." Id. The court noted, however, that
not all expressions of public policy will support a wrongful discharge action. Id.
For instance, certain regulations or codes of ethics serve only the profession and
not the public in general. Id. Such policies, according to the Pierce'court, may
not be sufficient. Id. "Absent legislation, the judiciary must define the cause of
action in case-by-case determinations." Id.
35. See GERALD P. PANARO, EMPLOYMENT LAW MANUAL § 7.05 (1993).
Panaro finds that this second element involves the employee proving that the
activity for which he was dismissed involves public interests and rights and not
simply private ones. Id. One way a court can make this determination is by
balancing the interest furthered by the public policy against the employer's in-
terest in running his business as he sees fit. Id. This appears to be the approach
originally taken by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand
Co. Standard Pump-Aldrich Division, 422 A.2d 611 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980), and
later integrated into the superior court's analysis in Cisco v. United Parcel Serv-
ices, Inc., 476 A.2d 1340 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). For a discussion of Cisco and
Yaindl, see infra notes 75-91 and accompanying text.
36. See PANARO, supra note 35, at § 7.02 (stating that courts either broadly
or narrowly define public policy). Courts also differ as to the scope of the excep-
tion. For instance, California has expanded the public policy tort doctrine so
that an employee need not be an at-will employee in order to sue for wrongful
discharge based on a public policy violation. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,
1532 [Vol. 38: p. 1527
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a variety of sources for the public policy and apply the doctrine when-
ever that policy is threatened by the employee's discharge.3 7 Courts
that narrowly apply the exception restrict themselves to statutory pro-
nouncements of public policy and apply the exception in limited circum-
stances only.38 How a court defines the exception largely reflects their
view of the strength of the various policies supporting the employment-
at-will doctrine.
On one end of the spectrum are states such as Georgia in which
only the legislature can create exceptions to the employment-at-will doc-
trine. In Borden v. Johnson,3 9 the Georgia Court of Appeals recognized
that an employer's power of discharge is restricted by public policy ex-
ceptions but held that creating these exceptions is a legislative func-
tion.40 The plaintiff in Borden brought a wrongful discharge tort action,
claiming that she was terminated because of a pregnancy.4 1 The Borden
court rejected the idea that the courts can allow recovery for wrongful
discharge tort claims.4 2 The court held that the legislature is responsi-
ble for defining both the public policy and the situations under which
violating the policy results in employer liability.43 Any employer liability
must arise from a violation of the applicable statute and not through an
independent tort action for wrongful discharge.44 Consequently, under
765 P.2d 373, 377 n.7 (Cal. 1988). Other states, like Pennsylvania, apply the
doctrine only to at-will employees. Darlington v. General Elec., 504 A.2d 306,
318 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
37. See, e.g., Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 903 (3d Cir.
1983) (finding public policy from First Amendment free speech right in absence
of state action); Cilley v. New Hampshire Ball Bearings, 514 A.2d 818, 820 (N.H.
1986) (basing wrongful discharge action on non-statutory basis); Delaney v.
Taco Time Int'l Inc., 681 P.2d 114 (Or. 1984) (stating that public policy viola-
tion can arise from violation of some important "societal obligation").
38. See PANARO, supra note 35, at § 7.02[2]. In addition to restricting the
sources of public policy, a court may also restrict the reasons for the public pol-
icy violation. Id. Thus, Some courts will find public policy violations only when
the employer retaliates and fires the employee for exercising his or her statutory
rights, for refusing to follow an employer's directive that is against the law or
when the dismissal itself directly violated the law. Id.
39. 395 S.E.2d 628 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
40. Id. at 629.
41. Id. at 628. The trial court granted the employer's motion for summary
judgment. Id.
42. Id. at 629.
43. Id. In this respect the court stated:
There is, however, a major difference between a general recognition,
on the one hand, that there may exist "public policy" exceptions to a
long-recognized proposition of state law and a specific recognition, on
the other hand, that the determination of the existence of a "public
policy" and how to enforce it is a judicial function.
Id.
44. Id. at 630. Thus, when an employer terminated an employee in viola-
tion of a public policy expressed in a state or federal statute, the employee's
remedy is limited to those provided for in the statute defining the public policy.
Id. Consequently, the court held that unless the Georgia General Assembly has
19931 NOTE 1533
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Georgia law, questions concerning the creation and application of the
exception are answered by the legislature, which defines the public pol-
icy and determines under what circumstances a violation of the policy
gives rise to a wrongful discharge action.
On the other end of the spectrum are those states which allow their
courts to develop additional exceptions without any prior legislative
mandate of public policy. 45 In these states, courts are free to look to-
wards statutes, constitutions and the common law in defining the public
policy, and are free to determine when the violation of these policies
gives rise to a wrongful discharge action.4 6 Here, the courts have the
freedom to answer both of the two questions without relying on the
legislature.
In between these two spectrums are the states that allow their
courts to create new public policy exceptions, but limit the circum-
stances in which the courts can discern public policy. This is accom-
plished either by restricting the sources of public policy or by restricting
the situations in which violating that policy gives rise to a wrongful dis-
charge action. One approach limits the exception to violations of statu-
tory rights or duties.47 Thus, a plaintiff can bring a wrongful discharge
action only if he or she is terminated for exercising an explicit statutory
right or refusing to violate an explicit statutory duty.48 This approach
not only ties the public policy into a legislative enactment, but restricts
the public policies to those mandating a duty or providing a right to
enacted an applicable public policy exception, a discharged employee cannot
bring a separate action for wrongful discharge. Id.
45. The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit's in Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984) is a good
example of this approach. In Lucas, the plaintiff was terminated after refusing to
sleep with her supervisor. Id. at 1203. The Eighth Circuit, interpreting Arkan-
sas law, held that the public policy exception would come "into play when the
reason alleged to be the basis for a discharge is so repugnant to the general
good as to deserve the label 'against public policy.'" Id. at 1204-05. The court
went on to state that this public policy is not restricted to legislative mandates
but encompasses common law as well. Id. at 1205. Thus the Eighth Circuit con-
cluded that the plaintiff stated a tort claim for wrongful discharge. Id.
46. See JEFFREY G. ALLEN, THE EMPLOYEE TERMINATION HANDBOOK 8-9(1986) (finding that courts on this end of spectrum find that "any clear mandate
of public policy, whether based on statute or simply judicial decree, will support
a claim for wrongful discharge").
47. See PERRIr, supra note 20, § 5.38.
48. Id Exercising a statutory right is the flipside of refusing to violate a
statutory duty. Id. The major difference between the two is that refusing to
violate a duty reflects a stronger policy. Id. When one has a duty not to perform
a certain act, he or she has no choice but not to engage in the prohibited con-
duct. Id. On the other hand, when one is given a right, one can choose whether
to exercise that right. Id. Thus, it can be argued that the policy underlying a
duty is stronger than that of underlying a right. Id This approach has been
criticized for not dealing with many cases where a wrongful discharge action is
warranted. Id. § 5.38 at 531.
1534 [Vol. 38: p. 1527
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individuals.49
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion in Bushko v. Miller Brewing
Co. 5 0 illustrates the statutory right/duty approach. 5 1 The plaintiff,
Bushko, claimed he was terminated for complaining about corporate
policies concerning plant safety, hazardous wastes and "honesty." 52
Specifically, Bushko claimed his employer fired him after Bushko con-
fronted his supervisor concerning the unsafe condition of a machine in
the plant.53 As evidence of a public policy, Bushko relied upon a statute
prohibiting the installation of machines that do not comply with state
safety regulations. 54 The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the public
policy exception applies only when an employee is fired for refusing to
violate a statutory or constitutional requirement. 55 The Bushko court
distinguished acting in conformity with a law with refusing to violate that
law at the command of an employer. 56 A person doing the former is
merely obeying the law. As the court stated, "[s]uch consistent action,
without an employer's command to do otherwise, is merely 'praisewor-
thy' conduct."'57 Because Bushko was not ordered to violate a statute as
a condition of continued employment, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
affirmed the employer's summary judgment motion.58
In addition to the various approaches taken by state courts, com-
mentators have suggested new ways of analyzing the public policy ex-
ception. These range from statutorily creating a just cause requirement
to removing the presumption that employees are at-will.5 9 One com-
mentator suggests a restrictive balancing of interests approach for ana-
lyzing wrongful discharge actions. 60 For an employee to recover upon a
49. Id. at 526. This approach basically results in less judicial activism and
more deference to the legislature. Id.
50. 396 N.W.2d 167 (Wis. 1986).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 168.
53. Id. at 172-73 (Abrahamson,J., concurring).
54. Id. at 168. The statute read:
101.17. Machines and boilers, safety requirement. No machine,
mechanical devise, or steam boiler shall be installed or used in this state
which does not fully comply with the requirements of the laws of this
state enacted for the safety of employees and frequenters in places of
employment and public buildings and with the orders of the depart-
ment adopted and published in conformity with §§ 101.01 to 101.25.
Any person violating this section shall be subject to forfeitures pro-
vided in § 101.02(12) and (13).
Id. at 168-69 n.2 (quoting Tax. CODE ANN. § 101.17 (West 1986)).
55. Id. at 172.
56. Id. at 170.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 172.
59. See Decker, supra note 18, at 496-502 (providing statutory structure to
regulate employment-at-will in Pennsylvania); Squire, supra note 1, at 668-71
(utilizing prima facie tort doctrine for wrongful discharge cases).
60. PERRITr, supra note 20, at 432.
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wrongful dismissal claim based on a violation of public policy, the em-
ployee must prove four elements: (1) the existence of a clear and sub-
stantial public policy (clarity element); (2) jeopardy to that policy if
employers are allowed to escape liability for terminating employees in
circumstances such as those involving the plaintiff, and thus chill policy-
linked conduct (jeopardy element); (3) actual conduct by the employee
promoting the public policy, which caused the dismissal (causation ele-
ment); and (4) lack of legitimate employer interest (other than the em-
ployment-at-will rule) justifying the dismissal (overriding justification
element).6 1 This approach provides a structure to the tort while giving
courts flexibility to balance the various interests involved. It also gives
courts the ability to limit the possible sources of the public policy with-
out giving up their discretion.
III. HISTORY OF PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION TO THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-
WILL DOCTRINE IN PENNSYLVANIA
Pennsylvania law first embraced the employment-at-will doctrine in
Henry v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R. Co.6 2 In Henry, the plaintiff's employer fired
the plaintiff, Henry, from his position as a traveling passenger-agent af-
ter investigating financial discrepancies in the passenger-ticket depart-
ment.63 Even though the plaintiff was cleared of any wrongdoing, he
was not reinstated.64 In upholding the employer's power of discharge,
61. Id. Professor Perritt states that this approach requires a balancing of
the employer's economic interest in running his business against the employee's
interest in employment. Id. Without any additional interest asserted by the em-
ployee, the employment-at-will doctrine tips the scales in favor of the employer.
Id. Consequently, for. the employee to succeed in the wrongful discharge claim,
he or she must assert an additional societal interest strong enough to overcome
the employment-at-will doctrine. Id. Even when the employee sets forth a socie-
tal interest, the employer is free to assert an additional justification for the dis-
missal that may result in a shift of the scales once again. Id.
62. 21 A. 157, 157 (Pa. 1891). Pennsylvania adheres to a presumption cre-
ating an employment-at-will relationship between employer and employee ab-
sent an express contract provision stating otherwise. Darlington v. General
Elec., 504 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) ("(A]bsent a contract, employees
may be discharged at any time, for any reason, or for no reason at all."); Geary v.
United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa. 1974) ("Absent a statutory or
contractual provision to the contrary, the law has taken for granted the power of
either party to terminate an employment relationship for any or no reason."). In
Scott v. Extracorporeal, Inc., the Pennsylvania Superior Court stated that an em-
ployee can overcome the presumption by express contract, implied contract or
additional consideration passing from the employee to the employer. 545 A.2d
334, 336 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); see also Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 511
A.2d 830, 841 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding intent to alter at-will employment
must be clearly stated to overcome presumption), appeal denied, 523 A.2d 132
(Pa. 1987); Veno v. Meredeth, 515 A.2d 571, 577 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (examin-
ing ways to overcome presumption in favor of at-will employment), appeal denied,
616 A.2d 986 (Pa. 1992).
63. Henry, 21 A. at 157.
64. Id.
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the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that absent a contract guarantee-
ing employment, "questions of malice and want of probable cause have
[nothing] to do" with an employer's decision to terminate an em-
ployee. 65 For eighty-three years, Pennsylvania courts consistently ap-
plied the employment-at-will doctrine. Then, in 1974, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court signaled a departure from the doctrine in Geary v. United
States Steel Corp.6 6 The plaintiff in Geary, a salesman of tubular products
for an oil and gas company, was discharged after reporting to manage-
ment possible defects in a new product. 67 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court upheld the discharge because the plaintiff violated company pol-
icy in by-passing his superiors when reporting his suspicions.68 The
court stated in dicta, however, that a wrongful discharge action might
exist if the discharge of an at-will employee threatens a "recognized
facet" of public policy. 69 Pennsylvania thus became the fifth state to
65. Id.
66. 319 A.2d at 176.
67. The plaintiff, Geary, was employed by United States Steel Corporation
(USX). Id at 175. Geary believed that one of the new products was defective
and informed his superiors of the product's possible dangers. Id. After being
instructed to "follow directions," Geary reported his suspicions to a vice presi-
dent in charge of product sales. Id. Even though USX eventually withdrew the
product from the market, USX nevertheless dismissed Geary. Id. Geary then
brought an action seeking both punitive and compensatory damages. I&. The
trial court granted the defendant's demurrer and the Pennsylvania Superior
Court affirmed. Id.
68. Id. at 179-80. In a four to three decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that where a complaint indicates that an employer has a legitimate
reason for discharging an employee and the discharge does not violate public
policy, the employee cannot bring a wrongful discharge action. Id. at 180. The
plausible reason for Geary's discharge was his disregard of company policy by
bringing his complaint directly to the vice president of sales, thereby by-passing
his immediate superiors. Id. at 179-80.
The Geary court recognized that since its prior decision in Henly, economic
conditions had radically changed:
The huge corporate enterprises which have emerged in this century
wield an awesome power over their employees. It has been aptly re-
marked that
We have become a nation of employees. We are depen-
dent upon others for our means of livelihood, and most of our
people have become completely dependent upon wages. If
they lose their jobs they lose every resource, except for the
relief supplied by the various forms of social security. Such
dependence of the mass of the people upon others for all of
their income is something new in the world. For our genera-
tion, the substance of life is in another man's hands.
Id. (quoting F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951)). It was against
this changing economic background that the court examined "judicial restric-
tions on an employer's power of discharge" and contemplated the possible ac-
ceptance of an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. Id.
69. Id. at 180. The court stated that:
It may be granted that there are areas of an employee's life in
which his [or her] employer has no legitimate interest. An intrusion
into one of these areas by virtue of the employer's power of discharge
1993) NOTE 1537
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acknowledge a possible exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. 70
Since Geary, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has addressed the ex-
ception's validity twice, once in 1989 and again in 1990. 7 1 Both prior
and subsequent to these decisions, federal and lower state courts in
Pennsylvania have attempted to develop parameters for the exception in
light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's narrow dicta in Geary.
A. The Public Policy Exception as Developed by the Pennsylvania Courts
1. Development of the Public Policy Exception After Geary v. United States
Steel Corp.
Despite the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's qualified acceptance of
the public policy exception, both state and federal courts in Penn-
sylvania interpreted Geary as endorsing an exception to the employment-
at-will doctrine.7 2 While developing this new common-law cause of ac-
might plausibly give rise to a cause of action, particularly where some
recognized facet of public policy is threatened. The notion that sub-
stantive due process elevates an employer's privilege of hiring and dis-
charging his [or her] employees to an absolute constitutional right has
long since been discredited.
Id. The court, however, refused to "define in [a] comprehensive fashion the
perimeters of this privilege," stating that this case did not provide the opportu-
nity to do so. Id.
70. Kramer, Comment, supra note 3, at 249. The four cases in which courts
have previously recognized an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine are:
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 550 (N.H. 1974) (holding public
policy violated when employee fired for refusing employer's sexual advances);
Snyder v. Regents of the University of California, 109 Cal. Rptr. 506 (Cal. App.
1973) (holding public policy violated when employee discharged for budgetary
restrictions); Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind.
1973) (holding public policy violated when employee discharged for bringing
workmen's compensation claim against employer); and Petermann v. Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 396, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. App. 1959)
(holding public policy violated when employee dismissed for refusing to commit
perjury). For a further discussion of Monge, Frampton and Petermann, see supra
notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
71. See Paul v. Lankenau Hosp., 569 A.2d 346, 348 (Pa. 1990) (holding that
equitable estoppel is not recognized exception to employment-at-will doctrine);
Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications, Inc., 559 A.2d 917, 919 (Pa. 1989)
(preventing plaintiffs from pursuing wrongful discharge claim due to failure to
pursue exclusive remedy under Pennsylvania Human Relations Act for sexual
harassment). For a discussion of Clay and Paul and their impact on Pennsylvania
law, see infra notes 97-122 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Burkholder v. Hutchinson, 589 A.2d 721, 723 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991) (concluding that Geary created public policy exception to employment-at-
will rule); Yetter v. Ward Trucking Corp., 585 A.2d 1022, 1025 (Pa. Super. Ct.)
(same), appeal denied, 600 A.2d 539 (Pa. 1991); Field v. Philadelphia Elec. Co.,
565 A.2d 1170, 1179 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (same); McGonagle v. Union Fidelity
Corp., 556 A.2d 878, 881-82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (same), appeal denied, 575
A.2d 115 (Pa. 1990); Scott v. Extracorporeal, Inc., 545 A.2d 334, 341 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1988) (same); Turner v. Letterkenny Fed. Credit Union, 505 A.2d
259, 260-61 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (same); Cisco v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 476
A.2d 1340, 1341 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (same); Hunter v. Port Auth., 419 A.2d
1538
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tion, Pennsylvania courts narrowly construed the exception, applying it
only in limited circumstances. 7 3 Thus far, only three Pennsylvania ap-
pellate courts have found that the dismissal of an at-will employee vio-
lated public policy.74
631, 635 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (same); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc.,
386 A.2d 119, 120 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (same); see also Hershberger v. Jersey
Shore Steel Co., 575 A.2d 944, 946 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (recognizing exception
to doctrine in limited situations), appeal denied, 589 A.2d 691 (Pa. 1991);
Rinehimer v. Luzerne City Community College, 539 A.2d 1298, 1301 (Pa.
Super. Ct.) (holding that Pennsylvania law recognized public policy exception),
appeal denied, 555 A.2d 116 (Pa. 1988).
When faced with a wrongful discharge action the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit also interpreted Geary as creating a public policy exception. See,
e.g., Smith v. Calgon Carbon Corp., 917 F.2d 1338, 1342 (3d Cir. 1990) (con-
cluding that Geary established certain exceptions to employment-at-will rule),
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 966 (1991); Woodson v. AMG Leisureland Ctrs., Inc., 842
F.2d 699, 701 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding that Geary was first case to recognize action
for wrongful discharge); Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363,
1366 (3d Cir. 1979) (finding existence of public policy against requiring employ-
ees to submit to polygraph examinations). Unlike the Pennsylvania Superior
Court, however, the Third Circuit did not immediately interpret the dicta in
Geary as endorsing a public policy exception. In Bruffett v. Warner Communica-
tions, Inc., 692 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1982), the Third Circuit opined that "the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has signaled its receptivity to the approach taken
by other courts that 'public policy reasons' might warrant imposing a limitation
on the employer's right to discharge." Id. at 918. The Third Circuit, however,
like the Geary court, refused to set down parameters for the exception. Id. It was
not until the Third Circuit decided Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 721
F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983), that the court concluded that Pennsylvania law did al-
low a wrongful discharge action "where the employment termination [abridges]
a significant and recognized public policy." Id. at 898.
In addition to the public policy exception, several Pennsylvania courts inter-
preted Geary as creating a specific intent to harm theory. See, e.g., Mudd v. Hoff-
man Homes For Youth, 543 A.2d 1092, 1095 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that
Geary created "intent to harm" theory); Darlington v. General Elec., 504 A.2d
306, 318 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (same). However, subsequent to the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court decisions in Clay and Paul, courts interpreting Penn-
sylvania law have concluded that the only viable exception to the employment-
at-will doctrine is the public policy exception. See Rutherford v. Presbyterian-
Univ. Hosp., 612 A.2d 500, 504-06 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (confirming that Clay
and Paul "clearly hold" that only exception to employment-at-will doctrine is
violation of public policy); Yetter, 585 A.2d at 1026 (same). But see Booth v. Mc-
Donnell Douglas Truck Servs., Inc. 585 A.2d 24, 28 (Pa. Super. Ct.) (interpret-
ing Geary as creating intent to harm theory with no mention of Clay or Paul),
appeal denied, 597 A.2d 1150 (Pa. 1991).
73. See, e.g., Smith, 917 F.2d at 1343 ("public policy exception to the em-
ployment at will doctrine has been interpreted narrowly"); Burkholder, 589 A.2d
at 723 (stating that public policy exception remains extremely narrow excep-
tion); Clay, 559 A.2d at 918 ("Exceptions to this rule have been recognized in
only the most limited of circumstances."). For a further discussion of the nar-
row interpretation of the public policy exception, see infra note 96.
74. Field v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 565 A.2d 1170 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989);
Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978). A third
Pennsylvania case, Hunter v. Port Authority, 419 A.2d 631 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980),
while not upholding a cause of action based on a wrongful discharge theory, did
discuss the public policy exception under the facts at hand. The most recent
1993] 1539NOTE
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Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. Standard Pump-Aldrich Division75 was the
Pennsylvania Superior Court's first attempt at defining the scope of the
public policy exception.7 6 In Yaindl, the Ingersoll-Rand Company em-
ployed the plaintiff as manager of customer service and as a technical
service engineer.7 7 The plaintiff was involved in an ongoing dispute
with one of the managers, which resulted in his discharge for insubordi-
nation. 78 The Yaindl court analogized the public policy exception to the
tort of intentional interference with the. performance of a contract. 79
The court held that in determining whether to uphold a wrongful dis-
charge cause of action, the court must weigh the employer's interests in
running his or her business, the employer's reason for dismissing the
employee, including the manner in which the dismissal occurred, and
any public policies or societal interests against the employee's interest in
earning a living.80 By balancing these factors, a court can determine to
case establishing a public policy exception is Kroen v. Bedway Security Agency,
Inc., 633 A.2d 628 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). In Kroen, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court held that the discharge of an employee for refusing to submit to a poly-
graph test gave rise to a wrongful discharge action. Id. at 633. The court fol-
lowed the Third Circuit's reasoning expressed in Perks v. Firestone Tire and
Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1969), and focused on the Pennsylvania
statute proscribing the use of polygraph tests in employment situations. Kroen,
633 A.2d at 633 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7321 (1986)). For a discus-
sion of Perks, see infra notes 156-63. For a discussion of Hunter, see infra notes
135-40 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Field, see infra noted 141-47
and accompanying text. For a discussion of Reuther, see infra notes 127-134 and
accompanying text.
75. 422 A.2d 611 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
76. Id. at 618. In examining the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's
dismissal, the court failed to "discern any clear public policy that was threatened
by appellant's discharge." Id at 620.
77. Id. at 614.
78. Id
79. Id. at 618. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979) states
that an action for intentional interference arises when a person "intentionally
and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract (except a contract
to marry) between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing
the third person not to perform the contract. . . ." Id.
The court viewed the wrongful discharge cause of action as analogous to
the tort of intentional interference with the performance of a contract. Yaindl,
422 A.2d at 618. Specifically, the court viewed as relevant to a wrongful dis-
charge action five factors used in determining whether a party properly pleads
an action for intentional interference: (1) the nature of the actor's conduct; (2)
the actor's motive; (3) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct
interferes; (4) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor; and (5) the social
interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual
interests of the other. Id. Consequently, the Yaindl court concluded that "the
most useful way to view an action for wrongful discharge is as a particularized
instance of a more inclusive tort of intentional interference with the perform-
ance of a contract." Id. While the court did not indicate exactly how these two
torts are assimilated, it did use the basic structure of the intentional interference
tort to mold the test set forth for the wrongful discharge cause of action. Id. at
620.
80. Id. at 620. In formulating the factors necessary in finding a wrongful
14
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what extent public policy concerns curtail an employer's interest in run-
ning his or her business. 81 One conmentator interpreted the Yaindl de-
cision as transforming the public policy exception into a just cause
requirement, necessitating an examination not only of traditional public
policy concerns, but also of the employer's motives and manner of
discharge. 82
Four years after Yaindl, the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Cisco v.
United Parcel Services, Inc.8 3 redefined the Yaindl test.84 United Parcel
Service (UPS) employed the plaintiff, Cisco, as a delivery person.85 A
customer accused Cisco of theft and trespass while making a delivery,
resulting in Cisco's termination.8 6 Although ajury later acquitted Cisco
of all charges, his repeated attempts at reinstatement failed.87 The
Pennsylvania Superior Court held that UPS did not violate public policy
by discharging Cisco, and found that UPS had a legitimate business rea-
son for terminating his employment. 88
discharge action, the Yaindl court discussed the theoretical basis for the wrongful
discharge action as enunciated in Geaty. Id. at 617. The court noted that a
wrongful discharge action is based upon the recognition that while the employer
has a strong interest in running his or her business efficiently and profitably, this
interest must sometimes yield to other societal interests, including "the interest
of the employee in making a living and the interest of the public in seeing to it
that the employer does not act abusively and a proper balance between the em-
ployer's and the employee's interest is preserved." Id
81. Id. at 617. The Yaindl court noted that "[t]he precise extent to which
the employer's interest in running his [or her] business is limited by considera-
tions of public policy cannot be stated but must be worked out on a case-by-case
basis." Id For a further discussion of the necessity of a case-by-case analysis of
the doctrine, see infra note 93.
82. Kramer, Comment, supra note 3, at 251. Kramer states that the factors
in Yaindl allow an employer to discharge an employee only for just cause. Id In
reaching this conclusion, Kramer reasons that in weighing the Yaindl court's fac-
tors, the employee's interest in maintaining his or her livelihood is generally
viewed as stronger than the employer's interest in an arbitrary discharge. Id.
Thus, a discharge that is not founded on just cause will generally tip the scale in
favor of the employee. Id.
83. 476 A.2d 1340 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
84. See Rinehimer v. Luzerne City Community College, 539 A.2d 1298,
1302 (Pa. Super. Ct.) ("the court, in effect, redefined the Yaindl balancing test"),
appeal denied, 555 A.2d 116 (Pa. 1988). In formulating its own two prong test,
the Cisco court examined the Pennsylvania court opinions in Geary v. United
States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974); Ruether v. Fowler & Williams, Inc.,
386 A.2d 119 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978); Hunter v. Port Authority, 419 A.2d 631 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1980); and Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. Standard Pump-Aldrich Divi-
sion, 422 A.2d 611 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980). Cisco, 476 A.2d at 1343.
85. Cisco, 476 A.2d at 1340-41.
86. Id. at 1341.
87. Id.
88. Id at 1344. In Cisco, the plaintiff asserted a public policy encompassing
a criminal defendant's right to a presumption of innocence. Id. at 1343. Cisco
claimed that this public policy is nullified if an individual can lose his livelihood
resulting from an accusation of wrongdoing. Id. The court held that the right to
a presumption of innocence was connected with the right to a trial. Id at 1342.
15
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The Cisco court stated that the first inquiry in a wrongful dismissal
action is whether the employer's action threatens a specific public pol-
icy. 89 If the employer's action threatens a specific public policy, the em-
ployer can escape liability only if the court determines that the employer
had a separate, plausible and legitimate reason for terminating the em-
ployment.90 One Pennsylvania court has suggested that the factors
cited by the Yaindl court become relevant when considering the second
prong of the Cisco test.9 1
After Cisco, the Pennsylvania Superior Courts considered the public
policy exception to be a well settled principle of Pennsylvania employ-
ment law.92 Courts have applied the exception on a case-by-case ba-
sis,93 however, stressing the necessity of a clearly mandated public
According to the court, Cisco could not carry over this presumption of inno-
cence throughout his remaining life experience. Id. at 1344. Consequently, the
court held tat dismissal did not violate a recognized public policy. Id.
89. Id. at 1343.
90. Id. One court suggested that the second prong of the Cisco test is not
absolute, and the ability of an employer to assert a separate and legitimate basis
of dismissal depends on the strength of the public policy. Veno v. Merideth, 515
A.2d 571, 581 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) ("Some public policies are of greater
importance than others. It follows that the more important the public policy
implicated by the discharge, the harder it will be to assert a sufficient separate
and legitimate business reason to justify the discharge."), appeal denied, 616 A.2d
986 (Pa. 1992); see also Scott v. Extracorporeal, Inc., 545 A.2d 334 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988) (citing Veno in support of balancing test). In Cisco, the court held that an
employer's interest in protecting his reputation by dismissing an employee ac-
cused of theft was a plausible and legitimate reason for dismissing that em-
ployee. 476 A.2d at 1344. This is true even though the employee was
subsequently acquitted of all charges. Id.
91. Rinehimer v. Luzerne City Community College, 539 A.2d 1298, 1302(Pa. Super. Ct.) ("It seems to us that the factors cited by the Yaindl court [aside,
of course, from consideration of any public policy involved] now go to the sec-
ond part of the Cisco test, that is, determining the legitimacy of the employer's
interest."), appeal denied, 555 A.2d 116 (Pa. 1988).
92. See Field v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 565 A.2d 1170, 1179 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1989) ("Since... Geary, it is now settled law in Pennsylvania that if the discharge
of an employee-at-will threatens public policy, the employee may have a cause of
action against the employer for wrongful discharge." (citations omitted)); see also
McGonagle v. Union Fidelity Corp., 556 A.2d 878, 882 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)(viewing issue as "well settled"), appeal denied, 575 A.2d 115 (Pa. 1990). Field was
one of the last cases decided by the Pennsylvania lower courts before the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court revisited the issue of a wrongful discharge action.
93. See Smith v. Calgon Carbon Corp., 917 F.2d 1338, 1344 (3d Cir. 1990)(recognizing that courts have been shaping public policy exception on case-by-
case basis), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 966 (1991); Field, 565 A.2d at 1179 (same);
McGonagle, 556 A.2d at 884 (same); Rinehimer, 539 A.2d at 1303 (same); Scott,
545 A.2d at 334 (same); Rossi v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 489 A.2d 828, 831-32(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (same); Turner v. Letterkenny Fed. Credit Union, 505
A.2d 259, 260 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (same). The view that creating public policy
exceptions requires case-by-case determinations originated in Yaindl v. Inger-
soll-Rand Co. Standard Pump-Aldrich Division, 422 A.2d 611 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1980). Id. at 617. The Yaindl court, noting that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court had refused to lay down parameters to the public policy exception, stated
16
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policy, 94 the overriding concern for the employer's interests95 and the
narrow scope of the public policy exception.9 6
2. The Effects of Clay and Paul on Pennsylvania Case Law
Fifteen years after the Geary decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court revisited the public *policy exception in Clay v. Advanced Computer
Applications, Inc.97 The plaintiffs in Clay, a husband and wife, brought a
wrongful discharge action against Advanced Computer Applications, al-
leging that Advanced Computer discharged Mary Clay for refusing sex-
ual advances by one of the Advanced Computer's managing level
employees. 98 Citing Geary, the Clay court recited the general proposi-
tion that Pennsylvania law does not recognize a common-law action for
the discharge of an at-will employee. 99 The Clay court noted that courts
have created exceptions only in the most limited circumstances where an
employee's discharge threatens a clear mandate of public policy. 00 The
Clay court did not consider the merits of the plaintiffs' wrongful dis-
charge claims, however, because the plaintiffs were first required to file
complaints under the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act, which covers
sexual harassment claims.10 '
While briefly discussing the development of the public policy excep-
tion under Pennsylvania law, the Clay court failed to express its own view
that "[t]he precise extent to which the employer's interest in running his [or her]
business is limited by considerations of public policy cannot be stated but must
be worked out on a case-by-case basis." Id.
94. E.g., Field, 565 A.2d at 1179 (stating that violation of a clearly mandated
public policy is essential element of public policy violation); Turner, 505 A.2d
at 261 ("[T]he employee must show a violation of a clearly mandated public
policy which 'strikes at the heart of a citizen's social right, duties, and
responsibilities.' ").
95. E.g., Rinehimer, 539 A.2d at 1302 ("[Tjhis court [in Cisco] made the de-
termination that the employer's interest in the operation of his business is an
overriding concern for the courts to consider in determining whether a cause of
action will lie for wrongful discharge."); Turner, 505 A.2d at 261 ("It is clear that
Geay (and] Yaindl... demonstrate a pattern of favoring the employer's interest
in running its business.").
96. See Burkholder v. Hutchison, 589 A.2d 721, 723 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)
(characterizing exception as "extremely narrow"); Scott, 545 A.2d at 342 ("Our
state appellate courts have found a plausible wrongful discharge cause of action
in only limited instances."); Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 511 A.2d 830,
842 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (noting that "action for wrongful discharge is a narrow
exception to the at-will rule and allows recovery only in limited instances"), ap-
peal denied, 523 A.2d 1132 (Pa. 1987).
97. 559 A.2d 917 (Pa. 1989).
98. Id. at 918.
99. Id.
100. Id. The court cited Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1978), as an example of the limited circumstances in which courts
have recognized wrongful discharge actions. Id. For a discussion of Reuther, see
infra notes 127-34 and accompanying text.
101. Clay, 599 A.2d at 919.
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on the status of the public policy exception, making no reference to the
"dicta" in Geary that purportedly created the exception.10 2 In addition,
the court failed to provide any additional guidance concerning the scope
and application of the exception.
ChiefJustice Nix, while concurring in the judgment, objected to the
majority's premise that Pennsylvania law recognizes the public policy ex-
ception to the employment-at-will doctrine.103 ChiefJustice Nix did not
read the court's language in Geary as creating a wrongful discharge ac-
tion.' 0 4 Instead, ChiefJustice Nix viewed the Geary language as "gratui-
tous dicta" that could not have created a cause of action for wrongful
discharge.10 5 According to Chief Justice Nix, Geary clearly held that a
wrongful discharge cause of action does not exist and considered the
recognition of the exception to be "inimical to the continued existence
of at-will employment."1 0 6
In contrast, Justice Zappala, in his concurrence, stated that Geary did
create an action for wrongful discharge.' 0 7 Nevertheless, he conceded
that "the circumstances under which this Court will recognize a cause of
action for wrongful discharge continue to evolve."' 08
102. Of course, even a recognition that exceptions to the employment-at-
will doctrine do exist can be interpreted as an acknowledgment of the excep-
tion's existence. The fact that both concurring opinions address the public pol-
icy exception seems to support this reading. See Clay, 599 A.2d at 922-23.
103. Id. at 922 (Nix, CJ., concurring). ChiefJustice Nix, while concurring
in the result, was concerned with the court's basic premise-that a common-law
cause of action exists when the dismissal of an at-will employee contravenes
public policy. l (Nix, CJ., concurring).
104. Id. at 923 (Nix, Cj., concurring).
105. Id. (Nix, CJ., concurring). ChiefJustice Nix further asserted that be-
cause the plaintiffs refused to seek redress through the means required by stat-
ute, and because no other cause of action exists, the court was correct in
dismissing the action. Id. (Nix, CJ., concurring). It is interesting to note that
while not filing a separate opinion, Chief Justice Nix dissented in Geary v.
United States Steel, 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974).
106. Clay, 559 A.2d at 923 (Nix, CJ., concurring).
107. Id. at 923-24 (ZappalaJ., concurring).
108. Id. (ZappalaJ., concurring). Justice Zappala stated that "[t]he seminal
case recognizing an exception to the at-will employment doctrine for wrongful
discharge of an employee is Geary." Id. (Zappala, J., concurring). Justice Zap-
pala's major concern with the majority opinion was the majority's ambiguity con-
cerning the existence of the public policy exception. Id. (Zappala, J.,
concurring). Specifically, Justice Zappala was concerned with the court's state-
ment that "we have never held that at-will employment terminations arising
from sex discrimination are actionable at common law." Id. at 923 (Zappala, J.,
concurring). Justice Zappala stated that "[t]o the extent that the majority's
statement is intended to foreclose the possibility that such a common law right
would be recognized in Pennsylvania, I must object." Id. (Zappala, J., concur-
ring). Noting the existence of a public policy favoring equal treatment of em-
ployees regardless of sex, Justice Zappala concluded that he "[would] not
eliminate the possibility that our developing body of common law would encom-
pass a cause of action for wrongful discharge arising out of sexual discrimination
once that issue is before us." Id. at 924 (Zappala, J., concurring).
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A year after Clay the Pennsylvania Supreme Court again examined
the public policy exception in Paul v. Lankenau Hospital.10 9 The plaintiff,
Paul, was a Yugoslavian physician employed by Lankenau Hospital. 1""
The hospital terminated Paul after allegations that Paul had taken five
refrigerators from the hospital without permission. 11 Paul claimed that
the hospital was equitably estopped from dismissing him for removing
the refrigerators.' 12 The question before the court in Paul was whether
the doctrine of equitable estoppel qualified as a public policy exception
to the employment-at-will rule.' 3
The court began its analysis by examining its prior decision in Geary,
noting that the Geary court "specifically answered in the negative the
central question of 'whether the time has come to impose judicial re-
straints on an employer's power to discharge.' "114 The court then ex-
amined its most recent affirmation of Geary in Clay, noting the
disagreement among the justices as to the existence and scope of the
doctrine."15 The Paul court concluded that "[t]he Geary-Clay analysis is
dispositive of the instant case," holding that the doctrine of equitable
estoppel is not an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. 16 As
in Clay, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Paul failed to define or pro-
vide parameters to the public policy exception. Instead, the court sim-
ply concluded, without further analysis, that "[a]n employee may be
discharged with or without cause, and our law does not prohibit firing
an employee for relying on an employer's promise."' "17
Due to the lack of discussion or analysis of the public policy excep-
tion under Pennsylvania law, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opin-
ions in Clay and Paul seemingly questioned the validity of the public
policy exception. Nevertheless, courts examining the exception subse-
109. 569 A.2d 346, 346 (Pa. 1990).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 347 & n.l.
112. Id. at 346.
113. Id. at 348.
114. Id. (quoting Geary, 319 A.2d at 176).
115. Id. at 348. The Paul court began its analysis by noting that the appel-
lee and amicus urged the court to read Geary as "a breakthrough in the recogni-
tion of some restrictions on the doctrine of employment at-will." Id. The Paul
court then quoted Clay, "[o]ur most recent affirmation of Geary," as holding that
"[e]xceptions to the [employment-at-will] rule have been recognized in only the
most limited of circumstances, where discharges of at-will employees would
threaten clear mandates of public policy." Id. (quoting Clay, 559 A.2d at 918).
The court then cited Chief Justice Nix's concurring statement that opined that
Pennsylvania does not recognize a wrongful discharge action. Id Therefore, it
does not appear that the Paul court was willing to either solidify the public policy
exception or nullify the exception's existence under Pennsylvania law.
116. Id.
117. Id. The court concluded by stating that "[i]n the absence of a legally
cognizable cause of action, the trial court erred in submitting the issue to thejury." Id. at 348-49.
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quent to these decisions have interpreted Clay and Paul as continuing to
recognize the exception."18 In Smith v. Calgon Carbon Corp., 1 9 for exam-
ple, the Third Circuit stated that until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
clearly states otherwise, or until other persuasive evidence of a change
in Pennsylvania law is found, the court was bound by its previous deci-
sions recognizing the exception.' 20 Interpreting Paul as supporting
Clay's implicit recognition of the public policy exception, the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court arrived at a similar conclusion in Hershberger v.
Jersey Shore Steel Co. 121 Consequently, both federal courts and Penn-
sylvania state courts continued to recognize the public policy exception
after Clay and Paul. These courts, however, have stressed both the ne-
cessity of a "violation of a clearly mandated public policy," and the ex-
treme narrowness of the exception.1 22
3. Sources of Public Policy for the Public Policy Exception to Employment-at-
Will Doctrine
An essential element in a wrongful discharge claim based on a pub-
lic policy violation is the establishment of a "violation of a clearly man-
dated public policy which 'strikes at the heart of a citizen's social rights,
duties, and responsibilities.' ",123 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
failure to establish parameters for the public policy exception has com-
plicated the determination of whether a purported public policy has suf-
118. See, e.g., Yetter v. Ward Trucking Corp., 585 A.2d 1022, 1025 (Pa.
Super. Ct.) (citing Clay and Paul as supporting recognition of public policy ex-
ception), appeal denied, 600 A.2d 539 (Pa. 1991); Booth v. McDonnell Douglas
Truck Serv., Inc., 585 A.2d 24, 27-28 (Pa. Super. Ct.) (making no mention of
Paul or Clay while restating the policy espoused in Geary), appeal denied, 597 A.2d
1150 (Pa. 1991).
119. 917 F.2d 1338, 1343 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 966 (1991).
120. Id. at 1343. While recognizing the viability of the public policy excep-
tion, the Smith court also acknowledged that courts have narrowly interpreted
the public policy exception. Id. The "Geary [court] feared that the 'everpresent
threat of suit might well inhibit the making of critical judgments by employers
concerning employee qualifications.'" Id. (quoting Geary, 319 A.2d at 179).
121. 575 A.2d 944, 946-47 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 589 A.2d
691 (Pa. 1991). The Hershberger court cited Clay for the proposition that Penn-
sylvania courts have recognized exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine
in limited circumstances, in which a significant public policy is threatened. Id. at
946 (citing Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications, Inc., 559 A.2d 917, 918(Pa. 1989)). The Hershberger court then read the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
decision in Paul as supporting this proposition. Id. at 947.
122. Burkholder v. Hutchison, 589 A.2d 721, 723 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)
("Since its enunciation in Geary, the public policy exception to the rule preclud-
ing wrongful discharge claims in at-will employment situations had been devel-
oped further, but still remains an extremely narrow exception in the courts of
Pennsylvania.").
123. Turner v. Letterkenny Fed. Credit Union, 505 A.2d 259, 261 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1985) (quoting Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 721 F.2d 894,
899 (3d Cir. 1983)). For a discussion of the requirement of a clearly mandated
public policy, see supra note 33.
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ficient support to satisfy the "clearly mandated test" and qualify as an
exception.' 24 The Pennsylvania Superior Court recognized this diffi-
culty in Cisco, noting that "[a] clear statement of what public policy actu-
ally consists of is hindered by its varying manifestations."' 125 Generally
speaking, however, Pennsylvania courts establishing public policy excep-
tions have based the public policy on a combination of statutory and
constitutional provisions.' 26
124. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Geary stated that "this case does
not require us to define in comprehensive fashion the perimeters of [the public
policy exception], and we decline to do so." Geary v. United States Steel Corp.,
319 A.2d 174, 180 (Pa. 1974). The court, however, indicated the type of situa-
tion in which the court might find a public policy exception-when an employer
intrudes into an area of the employee's life in which the employer has no legiti-
mate interest. Id.
In Smith v. Calgon Carbon Corp., the Third Circuit interpreted the language in
Geary as suggesting a limitation on the type of public policies that it would recog-
nize. 912 F.2d at 1344-45. The Smith court stated that:
where the conduct causing the discharge is workplace conduct as op-
posed to conduct in an area "of the employee's life in which his [or her]
employer has no legitimate interest," Geary suggests that in the absence
of such an endorsement, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would be
particularly reluctant to find an overriding public policy interest.
Id. at 1344 (quoting Geary, 319 A.2d at 180).
125. Cisco v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 476 A.2d 1340, 1343 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1984). The Cisco court looked to New Jersey law for guidance. Id. Under New
Jersey law, valid sources of public policy include legislation, administrative rules,
regulations or judicial decisions. Id. (citing Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (NJ. 1980)). Absent legislation, however, the New
Jersey Supreme Court stated that court must determine the existence of a public
policy on a case-by-case basis. Id. (citing Pierce, 417 A.2d at 512).
Generally, courts may find public policies by identifying a specific provision
of a statute, constitution, or administrative regulation, synthesizing a policy from
several different statutes or constitutional provisions, identifying a right or mode
of conduct covered by a traditional common-law cause of action or identifying a
trade practice or well recognized professional standard. PERRrrF, supra note 20
§ 5.10, at 448 (3d ed. 1992). Plaintiffs will have varying success in establishing a
public policy depending on which method of support the plaintiff utilizes. Id.
The best method is finding support in a statute or constitutional provision. Id.
§ 5.11, at 448. Absent statutory, constitutional or professional guidelines to
support the public policy, Professor Perritt opines that a plaintiff has a difficult
case. Id § 5.15, at 455. "In these circumstances, the court must decide what
public policy is from its own perception of community values and consideration
of competing interests." iL- Many courts are reluctant to play this role and in-
stead leave it to the legislature to make such decisions. Id. at 456-57. Yet there
is authority stating that courts are entitled to decide for themselves the parame-
ters of public policy. Id. at 456. This approach is suggested by Professor
Corbin: "In determining what public policy requires, there is no limit whatever
to the 'sources' to which the court is permitted to go; and there is no limit to the
'evidence' that the court may cause to be produced." Id (citing ARTHUR CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CoTRiAcrs § 1375, at 1165 (1962)). Professor Perritt has noted,
however, that "[t]he argument for ajudge inferring public policy from the com-
mon law is especially strong when the rights involved already are recognized in
other mature tort categories such as invasion of privacy." Id.
126. Scott v. Extracorporeal, Inc., 545 A.2d 334, 342 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)
(stating that public policy must be articulated in statutory or constitutional pro-
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The first case establishing a violation of a clearly mandated public
policy was Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc.,'12 7 in which the Pennsylvania
Superior Court found the need for citizens to be freely available to serve
on jury duty was the type of recognized facet of public policy to which
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Geary alluded.' 28 In Reuther, an at-
will employee was fired for attending jury duty during working hours.12 9
In determining that the employer's action constituted a public policy vi-
olation, the court relied on the broad dictum in Geary and the reasoning
of Nees v. Hocks,' s 0 an Oregon Supreme Court decision. 13 ' The Nees
court allowed an employee to recover damages resulting from her termi-
nation for attending jury duty.' 3 2 The court reasoned that allowing
such employer conduct would adversely affect the jury system and
thwart the will of the community. 1 3 In addition to Geary and Nees, the
Reuther court cited the Pennsylvania Constitution establishing trial by
jury, and two state statutes governing the requirements for jury duty, in
support of the proposition that the 'jury system and jury service are of
the highest importance to our legal process."1i 4
vision); see also Darlington v. General Elec., 504 A.2d 306, 318-20 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1986) (listing limited circumstances where violation of public policy
established).
127. 386 A.2d 119 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
128. Id at 121. The Reuther court began by stating the general rule under
Pennsylvania law that there "is no non-statutory cause of action for an em-
ployer's termination of an at-will employment relationship." Id. at 120 (citing
Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (1974)). The court went on to
note, however, that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, along with courts from
several other jurisdictions, has indicated that an employee might have a cause of
action when the discharge violated a clear mandate of public policy. Id. (citing
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1959); Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973);
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974)).
129. Id. at 119-20. The plaintiff informed his employer that he had been
selected to serve on jury duty and would be absent from work for a week. Id. at
121. The employer informed the plaintiff that he could be excused from jury
duty by telling the judge he had already formed an opinion from reading the
papers. Id Nothing more was said about the matter until the plaintiff returned
to work after serving for the week. Id. At that time, the plaintiff's employer
fired him for not getting excused from serving. Id
130. 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975).
131. Reuther, 386 A.2d at 120.
132. Nees, 536 P.2d at 516.
133. Id. The court reasoned that:
[Tihe jury system and jury duty are regarded as high on the scale of
American institutions and citizen obligations. If an employer were per-
mitted with impunity to discharge an employee for fulfilling her obliga-
tion ofjury duty, the jury system would be adversely affected. The will
of the community would be thwarted.
Id.
134. Reuther, 386 A.2d at 120. The court looked to Article I, Section 6 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution, which reads: "Trial by jury shall be as hereto-
fore, and the right thereof remain inviolate." Id. (quoting PA. CONST., art. I,
§ 6). The court also looked to two separate statutes dealing with jury duty.
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Shortly thereafter, the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Hunter v. Port
Authority135 upheld a cause of action against a public employer who de-
nied employment to an individual because of a pardoned conviction. In
Hunter, the plaintiff was denied employment as a bus driver because he
was previously convicted of aggravated assault and battery.13 6 In up-
holding a cause of action under the Pennsylvania Constitution, the
Hunter court examined the legitimacy of governmental bans on employ-
ment of ex-criminal offenders, the Criminal History Record Information
Act and article I, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 137 The Su-
perior Court held that "when a public employer denies employment to
an individual because of his criminal record, the employer's denial of
employment must be reasonably related to the furtherance of a legiti-
mate public objective."' 38 While the court did not uphold a cause of
action based on a wrongful discharge theory, the court did compare the
public policy involved with that asserted in Reuther.i s 9 The court stated
that the substantial public policy in rehabilitating and reintegrating for-
mer offenders into society is at least as compelling as that involved in
Reuther. 140
The last case prior to the Borse decision in which the Pennsylvania
Superior Court found a public policy violation is Field v. Philadelphia Elec-
tric Co.1 4 1 The court held that public policy is violated when an em-
ployer fires an employee for "perform[ing] a duty he [or she] was
required to perform under federal law."' 42 In Field, the plaintiff re-
ported violations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regula-
"[S]ambiances for jury service ... shall be deemed summonses of the
court, and disobedience to them shall be considered the same as diso-
bedience to any other summons of the court." [PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17, § 1336 (Supp. 1977).] One who fails to appear when summoned
for duty may be ordered to pay for every such default a sum not ex-
ceeding thirty dollars. [PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1099 (1962).]
Id at 120-21 (footnote omitted).
135. 419 A.2d 631 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
136. Id. at 632. The plaintiff applied for employment as a bus driver for
Allegheny County Port Authority. Id. Port Authority hired the plaintiff but later
informed him that because he falsified his employment application, he would not
go through training. Id. A question on the application requested information
concerning any past felonies or misdemeanor convictions. l The plaintiff did
not answer the question, being unsure as to the correct answer. Id. He ex-
plained to the Port Authority personnel assistant that while he was convicted on
aggravated assault and battery, he was later unconditionally pardoned by the
Governor. Id.
137. Id at 634-35.
138. Id. at 638.
139. Id. at 635-36 n.5.
140. Id. The court went even further by stating that "the absence here of
the competing due process and associational interests of the private employer in
Reuther makes the public policy in this case more compelling." Id.
141. 565 A.2d 1170 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
142. Id. at 1180.
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tions as required by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (ERA). 143
After a subsequent investigation by the NRC, Philadelphia Electric Com-
pany fired the plaintiff citing excessive absenteeism.144 The NRC inves-
tigation confirmed the plaintiff's reports and concluded that
Philadelphia Electric Co. discharged the plaintiff for reporting the NRC
violations.' 45 As evidence of an existing public policy, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court relied heavily on the presence of the statutory duty to
report NRC violations as well as the public interests furthered by com-
pliance with the ERA. 146 The court concluded that Field stated a
wrongful discharge action because "a statutory duty to act is present,
since discharge was based on performance of that statutory duty, and
since performance of that duty directly and clearly protects public
safety."'
47
The difficulty in defining public policy is further evidenced by the
reluctance of many courts to recognize wrongful discharge actions based
on public policy violations.' 48 Even when a plaintiff identifies statutes
143. Id. at 1173; see 42 U.S.C. § 5801 (1988).
144. Field, 565 A.2d at 1173.
145. Id. at 1173-74.
146. Id at 1180. The court stated that "[fWar from being unsubstantiated or
unclear, the dangers to the public are well-recognized, substantiated, and mat-
ters of great public concern.... In addition, Field's action of reporting NRC
regulations directly advanced the public concerns addressed by the ERA." Id
Consequently, the superior court concluded that the case was clearly in accord
with its previous decision in Reuther. Id
The defendants raised several arguments as to why the court should not
create a new public policy. Citing Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications,
Inc., 559 A.2d 917 (Pa. 1989), the defendant's argued that the presence of a
statutory remedy precluded an independent violation for wrongful discharge.
Field, 565 A.2d at 1181. The Field court noted that in Clay, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that Pennsylvania Human Rights Act (PARA), enacted to
remedy discrimination, precluded a plaintiff from asserting a public policy viola-
tion based on a discharge in violation of the PARA. Id. The Field court distin-
guished the PARA from the ERA on two grounds. Id. First, the language in the
PARA, unlike the ERA, indicates that the PARA procedures are mandatory in
redressing a violation of the act. Id. Second, under the PARA, the legislature
established a new administrative agency to deal solely with PARA violations. Id.
The ERA, by contrast, does not designate any special agency to resolve disputes.
Id.
Second, the defendants argued that the Field court, by allowing the wrongful
discharge action, would be creating "a common law tort relying upon statuto-
rily-created rights where violation of the rights are remedied by the statute." Id.
at 1182. In response, the court stated that they were "merely using the ERA to
find a stated public policy." Id.
147. Field, 565 A.2d at 1180. This analysis is similar to the statutory
right/duty approach discussed in Section II of this Note. For a discussion of the
statutory right/duty approach, see supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.
148. As the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Rossi v. Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity suggested, "[allthough each case must be decided on its own facts, these
cases [after Geary] are nonetheless revealing in that they evidence the great re-
luctance of the courts to recognize a right of action in an employee who alleged
that he [or she] was terminated in contravention of public policy." 489 A.2d
24
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and regulations supporting the alleged public policy, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court has found them insufficient to support a recognized and
significant public policy. For example, in McGonagle v. Union Fidelity
Corp.,149 the general counsel for an insurance company was fired for re-
fusing to issue policies that questionably violated statutes and regula-
tions of other jurisdictions. 150 The plaintiff relied upon Pennsylvania
insurance laws and regulations requiring compliance with the laws of
other jurisdictions as evidence of a public policy against violating the
laws of other states. 151 The Pennsylvania Superior Court interpreted
the Pennsylvania statutes as consisting of "general expression[s] of this
Commonwealth's attempt to monitor a particular industry."1 52 The
court concluded that "[w]e do not equate such broad and general state-
ments of policy violations to be tantamount to Geaty's 'clear mandate of
public policy which strikes at the heart of a citizen's social right, duties
and responsibilities' entitled to the status of a nonstatutory cause of ac-
tion." I53 Thus, these cases demonstrate both the limited circumstances
in which the Pennsylvania courts will find a public policy violation as
well as the limited sources of public policy that the courts are willing to
accept. 154
B. Third Circuit's Development of the Public Policy Exception
Over the past fourteen years, the Third Circuit has taken a varied
approach to interpreting Pennsylvania's public policy exception. At
times, the Third Circuit has strictly adhered to the Pennsylvania courts'
interpretation of the exception, while other times it has gone beyond the
scope of the exception as developed by the Pennsylvania courts.1 5 5 A
828, 837 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (quoting Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F.
Supp. 550, 563 (E.D. Pa. 1982)).
149. 556 A.2d 878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), appeal denied, 575 A.2d 115 (Pa.
1990). In McGonagle, the plaintiff was named general counsel to Union Fidelity
Life Insurance Company. Id. at 879. After three months as general counsel, the
plaintiff learned that Union Fidelity was not complying with several state insur-
ance regulations. Id. After reporting the violations to the executive vice presi-
dent in charge of marketing, the plaintiff came across more questionable
practices in several other states. Id. at 879-80. With knowledge of the financial
consequences, the plaintiff decided to halt issuing policies in the states in which
he felt the applications for such policies were illegal. Id. at 880. Shortly thereaf-
ter, the defendants asked for the plaintiff's resignation. Id.
150. Id. at 879-80.
151. Id. at 882-83.
152. Id. at 885. The court further stated that "[t]his point is consistent with
the plaintiff's characterization of the insurance laws of this Commonwealth as
being purely 'voluntary' in nature." Id
153. Id
154. See also Scott v. Extracorporeal, Inc., 545 A.2d 334, 341-42 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1988) (noting that Pennsylvania courts have carved out "very narrow excep-
tions" to employment-at-will doctrine and have found violations of public policy
in only limited circumstances).
155. Part of this result may be due to the fact that the Third Circuit has
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brief survey of the Third Circuit's decisions illustrates the court's varied
approach.
The Third Circuit first interpreted and applied the public policy ex-
ception in Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 15 6 Firestone Tire & Rubber
terminated the plaintiff, Perks, for refusing to submit to a polygraph ex-
amination. 15 7 Perks subsequently brought a wrongful discharge action
claiming his termination violated public policy.' 58 In examining Perks'
claim, the Third Circuit first alluded to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's broad language in Geary, which laid the theory for a wrongful
discharge action.159 The court then noted that the Pennsylvania Supe-
rior Court in Reuther utilized the Geary language in holding that an em-
ployer violates public policy by discharging an employee for attending
jury duty. 160 Looking for a source of public policy prohibiting
mandatory polygraph testing, the Perks court employed the Pennsylvania
polygraph statute. 16 1 The statute prohibits employers from requiring
polygraph examinations before individuals are hired or as a condition of
continued employment.' 62 Analyzing the public policy embodied in the
examined the public policy exception on a limited number of occasions ranging
over a long period of time. With each new case brought before them, the ThirdCircuit has had to look at the new Pennsylvania cases that were decided since theThird Circuit last interpreted the exception. This explains the Third Circuit'sdisparate approach to the constitutional basis of public policy between its deci-
sions in Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co. and Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc. Com-pare Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983) (basing publicpolicy on constitutional violations) with Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1992) (interpreting Pennsylvania law as rejecting constitu-
tional basis for public policy).
156. 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979).
157. Id. at 1364. Perks worked as a production coordinator, which required
numerous contacts with regional suppliers. Id. After an investigation concern-
ing employees accepting gratuities from suppliers, Perks was accused of ac-
cepting a prostitute provided to him by one of his supplier contacts. Id. Upondenying the charges, Perks' supervisor suggested that he submit to a polygraph
examination to substantiate his story. Id Within one week of refusing to submit
to the test, Perks was terminated. Id.
158. Id.
159. The Third Circuit quoted the following language from Geary:
It may be granted that there are areas of an employee's life in
which his employer has no legitimate interest. An intrusion into one of
these areas by virtue of the employer's power of discharge might plausi-bly give rise to a cause of action, particularly where some recognized
facet of public policy is threatened.
Id. at 1365 (citing Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 180 (Pa.
1974)).
160. Id. at 1365 (discussing Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d
119, 121 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978)). Reuther was decided one year prior to Perks.
161. Id. at 1365-66.
162. The statute provides that: "A person is guilty of a misdemeanor of the
second degree if he requires as a condition for employment or continuation of
employment that an employee or other individual shall take a polygraph test or
any form of a mechanical or electrical lie detector test." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 7321(a) (1986).
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Pennsylvania polygraph statute, the Third Circuit concluded that this
was the very type of public policy violation proscribed by the Geary and
Reuther courts. 6 3
The next Third Circuit case to address the public policy exception
was Bruffet v. Warner Communications, Inc.,164 where the court placed its
first restriction on the scope of the wrongful discharge common-law
remedy. The plaintiff, Bruffet, brought a wrongful discharge action
based on the public policy asserted in the Pennsylvania Human Rights
Act (PHRA), which prohibits handicap discrimination. 16 5 Unlike the
statutorily based public policy asserted in Perks, the PHRA provided a
remedy within its statutory structure. 16 6 The Bruffet court gave three
reasons why the Pennsylvania courts would not create an additional pub-
lic policy exception based on a PHRA violation.' 67 First, based upon
the language in Geaty, the Bruffet court grouped Pennsylvania with those
states that have taken a more constrictive view of the public policy ex-
ception. 16 8 Second, the court noted that allowing an independent com-
mon-law action would circumvent the administrative procedures of the
PHRA mandated by the Pennsylvania legislature.' 69 Finally, the court
noted that the Pennsylvania cases allowing a wrongful discharge action
have all involved instances in which no statutory remedy was available to
the plaintiffs. 170 Therefore, the Third Circuit predicted that the Penn-
163. Perks, 611 F.2d at 1366. The Third Circuit discussed the purpose be-
hind a similar statute in NewJersey where the NewJersey Supreme Court recog-
nized the lack of 'judicial control when an employer subjects his employee to a
lie detector test and there is no licensing or other objective method of assuring
expertise and safeguard in the administration of the test and the interpretation
of its results." Id at 1365 (citing State v. Community Distributors, Inc., 317
A.2d 697, 699 (N.J. 1974)). The New Jersey court went on to state that
"[o]rganized labor groups have often expressed intense hostility to employer
requirements that employees submit to polygraph tests which they view as im-
proper invasions of their deeply felt rights to personal privacy and to remain
free from involuntary self-incrimination." Id. at 1366.
164. 692 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1982).
165. Id. at 912. The PHRA states that "[i]t is hereby declared to be the
public policy of this Commonwealth to foster the employment of all individuals
in accordance with their fullest capacities regardless of... handicap or disability
. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 952(b) (1982).
166. See 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 951 et seq. (1982).
167. Bruffet, 692 F.2d at 918-19.
168. Id. at 918. The court focused on the Pennsylvania court's treatment of
wrongful discharge claims based on retaliatory discharges. Id. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Geay, unlike other jurisdictions, refused to base a public pol-
icy exception on an employer's retaliatory discharge of an employee. Id. at 918
(citing Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974), and Palmateer v.
International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981), as supporting such an
action).
169. Id. at 919.
170. Id. At that point in time, only three cases established public policy
violations. See Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber, 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979)(holding that public policy violated when employee discharged for refusing to
submit to polygraph test); Hunter v. Port Authority, 419 A.2d 631 (Pa. Super.
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sylvania Supreme Court would not create a common-law remedy based
on a PHRA violation. 17'
It is important to note that the Bruffet court, in reaching its decision,
stressed the delicate task facing federal courts when interpreting state
law. Chief Justice Sloviter underscored the court's role, stating that
"[o]ne of the authentic obligations of federalism at the judicial level re-
quires that we permit the state courts to decide whether and to what
extent they will follow the emerging law."' 72 This view of the Third
Circuit's responsibility in interpreting state law was shortlived. Just over
a year after Bruffet, the Third Circuit greatly expanded the scope of the
public policy exception in Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co. 173
The employer in Novosel, Nationwide Insurance Company, wished
to support a bill in the Pennsylvania legislature and ordered its employ-
ees to assist in the lobbying efforts. 174 The plaintiff, Novosel, brought a
wrongful discharge action after being terminated for refusing to provide
assistance and for privately stating his opposition to the company's
political stand. 175 The Third Circuit held that the employer violated
public policy embodied in the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion. 176 Prior to Novosel, no Pennsylvania court had established a public
policy violation solely on a constitutional provision. 177 Nevertheless,
the Novosel court viewed the important interests in political and associa-
Ct. 1980) (finding public policy violated when employer refused to hire
pardoned criminal); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1978) (holding that public policy violated when employee discharged
for serving on jury duty). For a discussion of Reuther and Hunter, see supra notes
127-40 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Perks, see supra notes 156-
63 and accompanying text.
171. Bruffet, 692 F.2d at 920. The court stated that "if Pennsylvania would
not recognize a common law action for discharge on the basis of handicap or
disability, it is less likely to recognize an action for failure to hire on the same
basis." Id.
172. Id
173. 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983).
174. Id. at 896. Nationwide wished to support the passage of "The No-
Fault Reform Act," then before the state legislature. Id. Nationwide instructed
its employees to clip, copy, and obtain signatures on coupons that bore the in-
signia of the Pennsylvania Committee for No-Fault Reform, an organization ac-
tively supporting the bill. Id.
175. Id. The plaintiff also claimed that the employer breached an implied
promise not to fire him so long as his performance was satisfactory. Id. Instead
of filing an answer to Novosel's complaint, Nationwide Insurance Company filed
a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted on the briefs alone. Id.
176. Id. at 899. The portion of the Pennsylvania Constitution on which the
Third Circuit relied provides that "[t]he free communication of thoughts and
opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely
speak, write and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that
liberty." Id. at 899 n.6 (citing PA. CONST., art. I, § 7).
177. See Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119, 120 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1978) (relying both on Pennsylvania Constitution and Pennsylvania statutes).
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tional freedoms as necessitating the creation of an additional public pol-
icy exception.' 78 Defining Geary's requirement of a "clearly mandated
public policy" as a policy which "strike[s] at the heart of a citizen's social
rights, duties and responsibilities,"' 179 the Third Circuit concluded thatdean employee's freedom of political expression would appear to involve
no less compelling a societal interest than the fulfillment ofjury service
or the filing of a workers' compensation claim."180 By allowing a plain-
tiff to rely strictly on a constitutional provision for evidence of the public
policy, the Third Circuit greatly expanded the scope of the doctrine.181
Five years after the Novosel decision, the Third Circuit returned to
the public policy exception in Woodson v. AMF Leisureland Centers, Inc. 182
Woodson involved the discharge of a barmaid who refused to serve liquor
to a visibly intoxicated individual.' 83 A Pennsylvania statute then in
force prohibited employees from serving visibly intoxicated individu-
als. 184 The Third Circuit in holding that the employer's actions in Wood-
son constituted a public policy violation noted that previous cases
establishing exceptions frequently involved situations in which the dis-
charge resulted from the employee's compliance with or refusal to vio-
late the law.'8 5
178. Novosel, 721 F.2d at 900. The Third Circuit interpreted the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court decisions in Geary and Sacks v. Department of Public
Welfare, 465 A.2d 981 (Pa. 1983) as extending "a non-constitutional claim
where a corporation conditions employment upon political subordination."
Novosel, 721 F.2d at 900. Sacks involved a public employee who was discharged
for publically criticizing his employer. 465 A.2d at 981. The court stated that a
public employer must caution against disciplining an employee where the harm
to the employer is "more than speculative" and the employee exercises his pro-
tected First Amendment speech rights. Id at 988.
179. Novosel, 721 F.2d at 899 (quoting Palmateer v. International Harvester
Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981)).
180. Id.
181. Id. The scope and importance of the decision is particularly evident
when noting that Novosel was a private employee and alleged no state action.
Id The Novosel court, however, did not view this as barring the plaintiff's cause
of action. Id The court opined that
[t]he protection of important political freedoms, however, goes well be-
yond the question whether the threat comes from state or private bod-
ies. The inquiry before us is whether the concern for the rights of
political expression and association which animated the public em-
ployee cases is sufficient to state a public policy under Pennsylvania law.
Id.
182. 842 F.2d 699 (3d Cir. 1988).
183. Id. at 700-01.
184. 47 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4-493(1) (1969). The statute stated that:
It shall be unlawful... for any licensee.., or any employee, servant or
agent of such licensee ... to sell, furnish or give any liquor or malt or
brewed beverages, or to permit any liquor or malt or brewed beverages
to be sold, furnished or given, to any person visibly intoxicated ... or
to habitual drunkards, or persons of known intemperate habits.
Id.
185. Woodson, 842 F.2d at 701-02 (citing Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber,
29
Gibson: Expanding the Public Policy Exception to the Employment-at-Will D
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38: p. 1527
The Third Circuit, in its final opinion interpreting the public policy
exception prior to Borse, once again placed overall limitations on the
public policy exception. In Smith v. Calgon Carbon Corp.,186 the plaintiff
brought a wrongful discharge action claiming that he was dismissed for
reporting to his supervisors environmental pollution caused by his em-
ployer's operations.' 8 7 It was shortly before the Third Circuit decided
Smith that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Clay and Paul cast doubt
on the validity of the public policy exception.' a8 Noting the problem
posed by these decisions, the Third Circuit nevertheless stated that "in
the absence of a clear statement by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to
the contrary or other persuasive evidence of a change in Pennsylvania
law," it was bound by its previous decisions recognizing the excep-
tion.1 8 9 The court then drew three general principles from previous
casei interpreting the public policy exception. First, the Third Circuit
noted that in each Pennsylvania Superior Court case that established a
public policy exception, the public policy was embodied in a constitu-
tionally or legislatively established prohibition, requirement or privi-
lege. t9 0 In the absence of either constitutional or legislative
endorsement, the Third Circuit found little evidence that a Pennsylvania
court would recognize an interest as constituting a "clear mandate of
public policy." 19 Second, the Smith court read Geary as displaying a re-
Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979) (stating cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge for refusing to submit to polygraph test); Shaw v. Russell Trucking Line,
Inc., 542 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (stating cause of action for reporting
motor vehicle violations); McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa.
1979) (stating cause of action for refusing to violate antitrust laws); Reuther v.
Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (stating cause of
action for serving on jury duty)).
186. 917 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 966 (1991).
187. Id. at 1339-41.
188. For a discussion of Clay and Paul, see supra notes 97-122 and accom-
panying text.
189. Smith, 917 F.2d at 1343.
190. Id. at 1344. In Yetter v. Ward Trucking Corp., 585 A.2d 1022 (Pa.
Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 600 A.2d 539 (Pa. 1991), the court stated that "in the
few cases in which this Court has held that a claim had been stated for wrongful
discharge based on the employer's violation of public policy, there existed a stat-
ute evidencing a legislative recognition of some public policy." Id. at 1026. In
Yeller, the plaintiff failed to show a violation of any statutory or judicially recog-
nized public policy. Id. at 1027.
In Hershberger v. Jersey Shore Steel Co., 575 A.2d 944 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1990), appeal denied, 589 A.2d 691 (Pa. 1991), the court held that pending legisla-
tion does not sufficiently support a finding of a clearly stated public policy. Id. at
947. The court noted that rather than supporting the plaintiff's argument, the
legislature's failure to enact the legislation may demonstrate its determination
that such a public policy does not exist. Id.
191. Smith, 917 F.2d at 1344. The court refused to decide whether a clear
mandate of public policy could exist absent a legislative or constitutionally im-
posed directive. Id. The Smith court analogize the case to the Geary decision and
seemed to establish another limitation on the public policy exception. Id. at
1345. The court stated that:
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luctance to find a public policy violation where the conduct causing the
discharge was not workplace conduct "in an area 'of an employee's life
in which his employer has no legitimate interest.' ",192 Finally, the court
stated that "a discharge may violate a 'clear mandate of public policy' if
it results from conduct on the part of the employee that is required by
law or from the employee's refusal to engage in conduct prohibited by
law."' 93 Examining the plaintiff's claim, the Third Circuit noted that
the plaintiff neither claimed he was discharged for refusing to violate
positive law, nor claimed he was discharged for performing a duty under
positive law.' 94 Thus, the court concluded that he could not sustain his
wrongful discharge action. 195
IV. INVASION OF PRIVACY AND DRUG TESTING
Faced with an increasing drug epidemic in our country, many em-
ployers are turning to drug testing as a method of protecting their inter-
ests in the workplace. 198 One of the most common methods of drug
testing is urinalysis; its popularity is due to its relative ease of adminis-
tration, low expense and its relative lack of federal and state regula-
tion.' 9 7 With the increased implementation of drug programs, however,
employers face legal challenges to their programs based on claims of
invasion of privacy, Fourth Amendment search violations, due process
claims, negligence law and contract law.' 98
Drug testing in the private and public workplace raises serious pri-
Based on the Geary opinion, we would expect the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, before recognizing a cause of action on behalf of an
employee who has complained to management about workplace con-
duct, to insist at least that the employee be charged either by the em-
ployer or by law with the specific responsibility of protecting the public
interest and that he or she be acting in that role when engaging in the
discharge causing conduct.
Id.
192. Id. at 1344 (citing Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174,
180 (Pa. 1974)).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1345.
195. Id. The Third Circuit was "unable to distinguish [Smith's] claim from
the one made and rejected in Geary's case." Id.
196. Mark A. Rothstein, Kenneth M. Piper Lecture: Drug Testing in the Workplace:
The Challenge to Employment Relations and Employment Law, 63 CH.-KENT L. REv.
683 (1987). Drug abuse on the job can potentially be very costly to the private
employer. "The costs of employee drug abuse borne by employers can be di-
vided into six categories: (1) lost productivity; (2) accidents and injuries; (3)
insurance; (4) theft and other crimes; (5) employee relations; and (6) legal liabil-
ity." Id. at 688.
197. Anne M. Rector, Comment, Use & Abuse of Urinalysis Screening in the
Workplace: A Proposal for Federal Legislation Limiting Drug Screening, 35 EMORY LJ.
1011, 1012 (1986).
198. Steven O'Neal Todd, Note, Employee Drug Testing-Issues Facing Private
Sector Employers, 65 N.C. L. REv. 832, 833 (1987).
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vacy issues.1 9 9 The United States Supreme Court has recognized the
privacy issues implicated in public sector drug testing, holding that
urinalysis drug screening constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.2 0 0
In the private sector, many employees challenge their employers' drug
testing programs as an invasion of their privacy. 20 1 Some employees
199. The process of collecting a urine sample may implicate privacy inter-
ests. See Luck v. Southern Pacif. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 625-27 (Cal.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 939 (1990).
200. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
665 (1989) (holding that United States Customs Service's drug testing program
was subject to reasonableness requirement of Fourteenth Amendment); Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 618 (1989). In Skinner, the
Court found that privacy interests are implicated in several ways:
It is not disputed, however, that chemical analysis of urine, like that of
blood, can reveal a host of private medical facts about an employee,
including whether he or she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic. Nor can
it be disputed that the process of collecting the sample to be tested,
which may in some cases involve visual or aural monitoring of the act of
urination, itself implicates privacy interests. As the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit has stated:
There are few activities in our society more personal or
private than the passing of urine. Most people describe it by
euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a function tradi-
tionally performed without public observation; indeed, its
performance in public is generally prohibited by law as well as
social custom.
Id. at 617 (quoting National Treasury Employee Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d
170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 485 U.S. 903 (1988), and aff'd in part and
vacated in part, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)). Thus, the Skinner court concluded that the
collection and testing of urine are intrusions that constitute searches under the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 618.
201. See Luck, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 636 (holding that while privacy interests
were implicated in testing, there was no public policy violation at time of viola-
tion as California Constitution was not interpreted to prohibit that type of test-
ing); Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that state constitutional privacy interests not implicated when job appli-
cant required to submit to drug testing where prior notice of testing given, col-
lection process involved limited intrusiveness, and safeguards were in place to
restrict access to results); Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 589 A.2d
170, 176 (NJ. Super. Ct.) (holding that invasion of privacy based on state and
federal constitutions does not constitute clear mandate of public policy), cert.
granted, 598 A.2d 897 (NJ. 1991), and aff'd, 609 A.2d 11 (NJ. 1992).
In Twigg v. Hercules Corp., 406 S.E.2d 52 (W. Va. 1990), the West Virginia
Supreme Court held that a mandatory drug testing program violated public pol-
icy concerning an employee's right to privacy. Id. at 55. The court analogized
the public policy based in the right of privacy to that based in polygraph exami-
nations. Id. The West Virginia Supreme Court had previously held in Cordle v.
General Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d 111 (W. Va. 1984), that "it is contrary
to the public policy of West Virginia for an employer to require or request that
an employee submit to a polygraph test, ... [and the] public policy against such
testing is grounded upon the recognition in this State of an individual's interest
in privacy." Id. at 117. The Twigg court did recognize two situations in which
the drug program will not violate public policy: where intrusion based upon
"reasonable good faith objective suspicion" of employee drug use and where an
employee's job involves public safety concerns. 406 S.E.2d at 55.
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have specifically relied on the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, claiming
that their employer's urinalysis program constituted a highly offensive
invasion of their privacy, thus violating public policy.20 2
Pennsylvania law recognizes the tort of invasion of privacy as estab-
lished in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.205 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has noted that "the existence of the tort of invasion of privacy in
this Commonwealth cannot be denied. '204 However, neither federal
nor state courts in Pennsylvania have directly or fully examined the rela-
tionship between drug testing and privacy interests in the private sector
and, specifically, whether a tortious invasion of an employee's privacy
qualifies as a public policy violation.
202. See Leudtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1133(Alaska 1989) (finding public policy protecting employee's privacy based on pri-
vacy clause in Alaska's Constitution, statutes protecting against employer intru-
sion and common-law tort of intrusion upon seclusion); see also Kelley v.
Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 849 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that direct
observation of employees urinating resulted in invasion of privacy). But see
Baggs v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 957 F.2d 268, 275 (6th Cir.) (holding that
while plaintiff's program may constitute intrusion upon seclusion, Michigan law
allows employers to use intrusive means to obtain employment related informa-
tion), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 466 (1992); Jennings v. Minco Tech. Labs, Inc., 765
S.W.2d 497, 500 (Tx. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that plaintiff's claim that em-
ployer's drug program intruded upon plaintiff's seclusion cannot stand because
plaintiff consented to testing).
The right of privacy was first enunciated in 1890 by Samuel D. Warren and
Louis D. Brandeis in their article, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193(1890). Since then, the tort of invasion of privacy has been broken down into
four specific torts. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, one's right of
privacy is violated by "(a) an unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of an-
other, (b) an appropriation of the other's name or likeness, (c) unreasonable
publicity given to the other's private life, (d) publicity that unreasonably places
the other in a false light before the public." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652A(2)(a)-(d) (1977).
The tort of intrusion upon seclusion is defined in the Restatement, which
states that "(o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652B
(1977).
203. In Vogel v. W. T. Grant Co., 327 A.2d 183 (Pa. 1974), the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court adopted the tentative draft of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, viewing it as both "logical and precise" and recognizing that "[i]t is in
accord with the common-law development of the tort of invasion of privacy in
Pennsylvania." Id. at 136. While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not ac-
cepted the final draft of the Restatement, the Third Circuit predicted that if given
the opportunity, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adopt the sections con-
cerning the privacy torts. O'Donnell v. United States, 891 F.2d 1079, 1082 n.1
(3d Cir. 1989); see also Harris by Harris v. Easton Publishing Co., 483 A.2d 1377,
1383 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) ("We believe that the Restatement most ably defines
the elements of invasion of privacy as that tort has developed in Pennsylvania.").
204. Marks v. Bell Tel. Co., 331 A.2d 424, 430 (Pa. 1975); see also Vogel, 327
A.2d at 134 ("the existence of the right [of privacy] in this Commonwealth is
now firmly established ... despite the fact that its perimeter is not yet clearly
delineated" (citations omitted)).
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The first case to touch upon the relationship between a wrongful
discharge action and an action based on the invasion of an employee's
privacy is Rogers v. International Business Machines Corp.2 0 5 In Rogers, an
ex-employee brought an action against his former employer claiming
wrongful discharge and invasion of privacy.206 The defendant em-
ployer, IBM, dismissed the plaintiff after investigating his activities at
the workplace.2 07 The employer found that the employee's relationship
with another employee "exceeded normal or reasonable business as-
sociations," and negatively affected his work performance. 20 8
The United States District Court for the Western District of Penn-
sylvania first considered the plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim.20 9
Rogers asserted that his termination was improperly based on an investi-
gation into his private matters-matters in which his employer had no
legitimate interest.210 The court, however, found no "corporate impro-
priety" that violated public policy. 21' The district court determined that
the employer acted reasonably in his investigation and subsequent em-
ployment action.212 According to the district court, not only was the
plaintiff involved in the investigation, but the allegations focused on his
job performance, an area in which an employer has a legitimate inter-
est.215 The district court next examined the plaintiff's invasion of pri-
vacy claim, concluding that because the investigation was limited to
interviews of employee's and examination of public records, the court
could find no invasion of the plaintiff's privacy.2 14 The court did not,
however, consider whether a tortious invasion into the employee's pri-
205. 500 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
206. Id. at 866. The plaintiff, John Rogers, was Pittsburgh Branch Manager
for IBM. Id. He was employed for 14 years before being dismissed. Id.
207. Id. The employer's investigation focused on various areas including
deviceness, business judgment, loyalty and personal conduct. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. The court noted that Pennsylvania law presumes an at-will rela-
tionship absent express contractual terms stating otherwise. Id. Because there
was no evidence of either an express or implied contract between the parties, the
court concluded that the parties created an at-will relationship. Id. at 869.
210. Id at 869.
211. Id. The court stated that "(a] broad assertion that IBM acted inten-
tionally, wrongfully and without justification does not meet the test of Geary v. U.
S. Steel Corp." Id
212. Id
213. Id. Citing Geary, the district court noted that "an employer has a legiti-
mate interest in 'preserving harmony among its employees and in preserving its
normal operational procedures from disruption.'" Id.
214. Id. at 870. The court focused on section 652A(2) of the Restatement(Second) of Torts, which lists four ways in which a person's privacy is invaded: (1)
intrusion upon seclusion of another's privacy; (2) appropriation of another's
name or likeness; (3) unreasonable publicity of private matters; (4) publication
which places one in a false light. Id. Initially focusing on the tort of intrusion
upon seclusion, the court found no invasion of privacy based on this theory. Id.
The investigation was limited to the examination of company records and the
interview of full time company employees. Id. The court also found no publica-
1560 [Vol. 38: p. 1527
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vacy would constitute the violation of a clearly mandated public policy
under Pennsylvania law.2 15
While Rogers is the only case under Pennsylvania law to examine the
relationship between the tort of invasion of privacy and the public policy
exception, Hershberger v. Jersey Shore Steel Co. 2 1 6 is the only Pennsylvania
case to consider whether drug testing raises sufficient public policy con-
cerns required for the public policy exception. In Hershberger, the plain-
tiff employee was asked to resign after failing two consecutive drug
tests.217 The plaintiff then obtained a sample of his urine which had
previously tested positive and subjected it to a more reliable test.2 1 8
The sample tested negative.219 After requesting reinstatement, Jersey
Shore Steel told the plaintiff that he had resigned and would not be re-
hired.220 The plaintiff then brought this action claiming that Jersey
Shore Steel violated public policy by not confirming the first test with an
alternative method of testing.221 As evidence of the public policy, the
plaintiff relied on: pending legislation in Pennsylvania that would re-
quire confirmatory testing before discharging an employee; existing leg-
islation in eight other states that required additional testing by
alternative methods; and expert testimony by physicians stating that
they would not have confirmed the positive results using the identical
testing procedure.222 The Pennsylvania Superior Court, however, held
that the evidence presented failed to support a "clear mandate in the
form of public policy" and dismissed the plaintiff's wrongful discharge
action.223
tion of private activities because the plaintiff could not establish any publication.
Id.
215. Id. at 868-70.
216. 575 A.2d 944 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 589 A.2d 691 (1991).
217. Id. at 945. The tests were performed as part of a new employee 60-day
probation period. Id. After failing the test, the plaintiff was given the option of
either resigning or being fired. Id.
218. Id. The alternative test is known as a gas chromatography mass spec-
trometry. Id. In addition to testing the sample obtained from his employer, the
plaintiff had a separate test performed on a sample collected the day after his
resignation. Id. Both tests resulted in negative readings for marijuana. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. The plaintiff's employer informed the plaintiff that if he were able
to provide documentation demonstrating a flaw in the employer's testing proce-
dure, the employer would place the plaintiff in a pool of applicants to be consid-
ered for subsequent positions. Id.
221. Id. at 946-47.
222. Id. at 947-48.
223. Id. at 947. The court did not view any of the evidence as persuasive
grounds for finding a public policy in Pennsylvania. Dealing with the pending
Pennsylvania legislation, the court stated that the legislature's inaction on the
legislation acts like "a two-edged sword . . . undermin[ing] such an assertion
counseling against the creation of a cause of action by judicial fiat for wrongful
discharge in drug testing cases." Id. As to the eight other jurisdictions enacting
such legislation, the court stated that it was "not persuaded to join in the crea-
tion of an exception to our at-will employment precept." Id. Finally the court
1993] NOTE 1561
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Consequently, while courts interpreting Pennsylvania law have
touched upon the implications of private employer drug testing on pub-
lic policy and employee privacy interests, Pennsylvania law in this area
remains relatively undeveloped. The Third Circuit's decision in Borse v.
Piece Goods Shop, Inc.224 was the first time that a court fully examined
these issues under Pennsylvania law.
2 25
V. DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS
In 1990, Piece Goods Shop initiated a drug and alcohol program
that required its employees to sign a consent form and submit to urinal-
ysis screening and personal property searches.226 Piece Goods Shop
fired the plaintiff, Sarah Borse, after she refused to sign the consent
form. 22 7 Ms. Borse brought a wrongful discharge action claiming that
Piece Goods Shop fired her in retaliation for her refusal to comply with
the drug testing program. 228 She claimed that her discharge violated
public policy as contained in the First and Fourth Amendments of the
United States Constitution. 229 The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted Piece Goods Shop's motion to
dismiss, and Ms. Borse appealed. 230
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit divided its opinion in
Borse into two major sections.231 In the first section, the court provided
stated that the testimony relied upon by the plaintiff "is anything but dispositive
as to the unreliability of the [testing procedure used by Jersey Shore Steel Co.]"
Id.
224. 963 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that Pennsylvania courts have not
considered whether public policy is violated when employer tortiously invades
privacy of an employee, resulting in employee's discharge).
225. Id. at 621-22. While the Hershberger court examined the public policy
implication of confirmatory drug testing, no court had previously explored the
relationship between employee drug testing in general and its privacy and publicpolicy implications.
226. Id. at 613. The screening program initiated by Piece Goods was for
drug use. Id. The personal property search involved personal property located
on the shop's premises. Id
227. Id. Ms. Borse worked for Piece Goods Shop for 15 years as a sales
clerk. Id. On several occasions, Ms. Borse protested against the program alleg-
ing that it violated her right to privacy and right to be free from unwarranted
searches and seizures. Id. Piece Goods Shop continued to insist on her cooper-
ation, and after threatening several times to fire her if she continued to protest,
Piece Goods Shop fired her on February 9, 1990. Id
228. Id.
229. Id. The asserted public policy prohibits employers from violating their
employees' privacy rights and freedom from unwarranted searches. Id. Ms.
Borse sought compensatory damages for emotional distress, injury to reputa-
tion, loss of earnings and diminished capacity earnings. Id. She also sought
punitive damages, claiming that the defendant's actions were willful and mali-
cious. Id.
230. Id. The district court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for failing to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted. Id.
231. Id at 614, 618.
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an overview of Pennsylvania's public policy exception, examining case
law from both federal and state courts in Pennsylvania, and concluded
that the violation of public policy is a recognized exception to the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine in Pennsylvania. 23 2 In the second section, the
Third Circuit examined the Pennsylvania and United States Constitu-
tions and the Pennsylvania common law for evidence of a clearly man-
dated public policy. 233 The Third Circuit concluded that a clearly
mandated public policy exists prohibiting an employer from invading an
employee's privacy. 234 The court based this public policy in the com-
mon-law privacy tort of intrusion upon seclusion.25 5 ,
The Third Circuit in Borse began its overview of the public policy
exception in Pennsylvania with an examination of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's decisions in Geary, Clay and Paul.236 After noting the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's implicit endorsement of the public policy
exception in Geary,23 7 the Borse court considered the impact of the sub-
sequent supreme court decisions.23 8 The Borse court noted that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Clay, while not controverting its dicta in
Geary, stressed the narrowness of the public policy exception. 23 9 As to
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Paul, the Borse court
opined that although the supreme court had "question[ed] the validity
of the public policy exception, .. . it did not expressly inter it." 240 The
Borse court concluded by noting that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has not addressed the issue since its decision in Paul.2 41
The Third Circuit in Borse next surveyed the development of the
public policy exception in the Pennsylvania Superior Court.242 Focus-
ing on cases in which the superior court upheld a wrongful discharge
232. Id. at 614-18.
233. Id. at 618-28.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 620-23. For a discussion of the Borse court's conclusions, see
infra notes 236-301 and accompanying text.
236. Borse, 963 F.2d at 614-15.
237. Id. at 614. The Borse court noted that while the court in Geary did not
apply the exception to the facts before it, subsequent courts construing Penn-
sylvania law interpreted Geary as endorsing the public policy exception. Id. at
615 (citing Woodson v. AMF Leisureland Ctrs., Inc., 842 F.2d 699 (3d Cir.
1988); Field v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 565 A.2d 1170 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989);
Hunter v. Port Auth., 419 A.2d 631 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); Reuther v. Fowler &
Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978)).
238. Borse, 963 F.2d at 614-15.
239. Id. at 614. In a footnote, the Borse court also noted, without comment,
Justice Nix's dissenting opinion, which did not read Geary as creating a public
policy exception. Id. at 615 n.l.
240. Id. at 615. For a discussion of other Pennsylvania court's interpreta-
tion of the effects of Clay and Paul on the Geary decision, see supra notes 118-122
and accompanying text.
241. Borse, 963 F.2d at 615.
242. Id. at 615-17.
19931 NOTE 1563
37
Gibson: Expanding the Public Policy Exception to the Employment-at-Will D
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
action, the Third Circuit examined Reuther, Hunter and Field.2 43 The
Borse court recited the facts and holdings in each case, specifically scruti-
nizing the statutory and constitutional basis of the public policy at issue
in each case. 244
After examining the specific applications of the public policy excep-
tion, the Borse court shifted focus and examined the development of the
parameters of the wrongful discharge action under Pennsylvania law.24 5
Beginning with Yaindl, the Borse court described the apparent expansion
of the exception into a "just cause requirement for discharging an at-will
employee." 246 The Third Circuit noted that in analogizing a wrongful
discharge claim to an action for intentional interference with a contract,
the Yaindl court balanced the employer's interests in dismissal against
the employee's interest in earning a living.2 4 7 In an arbitrary discharge,
this balancing would generally fall in favor of the employee's interest in
earning a living and would result in a just cause requirement. 24 8
The Borse court next recounted the return to the focus on public
policy in Cisco v. United Parcel Services, Inc. 249 Instead of balancing the
employee's interests in earning a living against the employer's asserted
interests, the Cisco court determined whether the discharge threatened
public policy. 250
Finally, the Third Circuit noted that cases subsequent to Cisco, while
retaining a focus on public policy, stressed the importance of a clearly
stated public policy. 25 1 As an example, the court cited Turner v. Let-
terkenny Federal Credit Union,25 2 where the Pennsylvania Superior Court
held that a clearly mandated public policy is an essential element of a
243. Id. at 615-16. For a further discussion of Reuther, Hunter and Field, see
supra note 123-47.
244. Borse, 963 F.2d at 615-16.
245. Id. at 616-17. The court distinguished this general approach from the
case-by-case application of Geary. Id. at 616.
246. Id. at 616.
247. Id. The Third Circuit read Yaindl as recognizing that "the employer's
interest in running its business as it sees fit must sometimes yield to the em-
ployee's interest in making a living and to the public's interest in ensuring that
the employer does not act abusively." Id. (citing Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.
Standard Pump-Aldrich Div., 422 A.2d 611, 617 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980)).
248. Id. The Third Circuit noted that the Yaindl court's analysis appeared
to expand greatly the public policy exception by apparently creating ajust cause
requirement, requiring the court to balance the employer's and employee's in-
terests. Id. For a discussion of the Yaindl decision, see supra notes 75-82 and
accompanying text. In interpreting Yaindl as establishing a just cause require-
ment, the Borse court cited Kramer, Comment, supra note 3, at 251. Borse, 963
F.2d at 616.
249. Borse, 963 F.2d at 616.
250. Id.
251. Id at 617-18. For a complete discussion of Cisco, see supra notes 83-91
and accompanying text.
252. 505 A.2d 259 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
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wrongful discharge claim.253 The Borse court summarized recent supe-
rior court decisions as embracing the public policy exception while em-
phasizing a narrow interpretation of the exception.254
After examining the Pennsylvania state court cases interpreting the
public policy exception, the Borse court briefly surveyed the prior Third
Circuit cases interpreting Pennsylvania law.255 The Borse court noted
that prior and subsequent to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions
in Clay and Paul the Third Circuit interpreted Pennsylvania law as recog-
nizing a public policy exception.256 The Borse court cited three reasons
for interpreting Geary as recognizing a cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge when the dismissal of an at-will employee violates a clear man-
date of public policy. 2 57 First, in Smith v. Calgon Carbon Corp. ,258 decided
after Clay and Paul, the Third Circuit stated that it would recognize a
wrongful discharge cause of action absent a "clear statement" from the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejecting the public policy exception.259
Second, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not addressed the public
policy exception since Paul, and the Third Circuit was unaware of any
"persuasive evidence of a change in Pennsylvania law."'260 Finally, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court after Paul continued to interpret Penn-
sylvania law as recognizing a wrongful discharge cause of action.261
After concluding that Pennsylvania recognizes a cause of action for
wrongful discharge, the Borse court examined three possible sources of
public policy-the United States Constitution, the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution and Pennsylvania common law.2 62 The court first examined the
253. Borse, 963 F.2d at 617. The Turner court stated that Ceaiy "made clear
that an essential element in permitting a cause of action for wrongful discharge
was a finding of a clearly defined mandate of public policy." Turner, 505 A.2d at
260. The Borse court also cited Rinehimer v. Luzerne County Community Col-
lege, 539 A.2d 1298 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) and McGonagle v. Union Fidelity
Corp., 556 A.2d 878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). Borse, 963 F.2d at 617.
254. Borse, 963 F.2d at 617. Summarizing the superior court decisions, the
Borse court stated that while the superior court has continued to interpret Penn-
sylvania law as recognizing a public policy exception, "its most recent decisions
emphasize that the exception is a narrow one." Id. (citing Burkholder v. Hutchi-
son, 589 A.2d 721, 723 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) and Yetter v. Ward Trucking Co.,
585 A.2d 1022, 1025 (Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 600 A.2d 539 (1991)). Con-
sequently, "[t]he public policy violated must be clear and specific before the
court will uphold the cause of action." Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. (citing Woodson v. AMF Leisureland Ctrs, Inc., 842 F.2d 699 (3d
Cir. 1988); Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983); Bruffett
v. Warner Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1982); Perks v. Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979)). For a discussion of the
Third Circuit's interpretation of Geary, see supra note 72.
257. Borse, 963 F.2d at 617.
258. 917 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 966 (1991).
259. Borse, 963 F.2d at 617 (quoting Smith, 917 F.2d at 1343).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 618-24.
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United States Constitution for evidence of a public policy. 263 The plain-
tiff in Borse relied on the Third Circuit's decision in Novosel to support
her claim that the United States Constitution can support a public policy
in the absence of state action.2 64 In Novosel, an employee was dis-
charged for refusing to take part in his employer's efforts to lobby the
Pennsylvania legislature and for opposing the employer's political posi-
tions.2 65 Even though the plaintiff in Novosel did not claim state action,
the Third Circuit nevertheless relied on the federal constitution as the
source of public policy. 26 6 The Borse court, however, refused to expand
Novosel beyond its facts. 26 7 The Borse court noted that the Pennsylvania
Superior Court in recent cases had refused to look to constitutional pro-
visions absent state action.268 This fact, coupled with the Pennsylvania
Superior Court's narrow interpretation of the public policy exception,
led the Borse court to predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
would not look to the federal constitution for evidence of a public
policy.2
6 9
Similarly, the Borse court predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court would not rely on the Pennsylvania Constitution as evidence of a
public policy. 270 According to the Borse court, while the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has recognized the right of privacy embodied in the
Pennsylvaiia Constitution, it has not determined whether that right ex-
tends to private actors. 2 7 1
263. Id. at 618-20.
264. It at 618. Ms. Borse relied on both the First and Fourth Amendments
to the United States Constitution. Id.
265. Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 896 (3d Cir. 1983).
266. Id. at 898-99. In upholding the wrongful dismissal action absent state
action, the Novosel court noted that several Pennsylvania Superior Court cases
implied public policies from constitutional provisions regardless of the presence
of state action. Id. (citing Hunter v. Port Authority, 419 A.2d 631, 635 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1980) and Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119, 121 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1978)). In each of these instances, no statutory remedies were avail-
able to the plaintiffs. Ia Consequently, because the plaintiff in Novosel also
lacked statutory remedies, the Third Circuit followed the superior court in look-
ing to the Federal Constitution for evidence of a public policy. Id. at 899.
267. Borse, 963 F.2d at 620.
268. Id. at 619 (citing Cisco v. United Parcel Services, Inc., 476 A.2d 1340,
1344 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984), and Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 511 A.2d
830, 844 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)).
269. Id. at 620.
270. Id While the plaintiff did not rely on the Pennsylvania Constitution to
establish a public policy violation, the parties submitted supplemental briefs on
the issue at the request of the court. Id.
271. Id. The right of privacy is protected in the Pennsylvania Constitution
by Article 1, section 1. Id (citing In re June 1979 Allegheny County Investigat-
ing Grand Jury, 415 A.2d 73, 77 (Pa. 1980)). Article I, section 1 provides: "All
men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and inde-
feasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and lib-
erty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of
pursuing their own happiness." PA. CONST. art. I, § 1. The Borse court noted
1566 (Vol. 38: p. 1527
40
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 5 [1993], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol38/iss5/4
Concluding that the Pennsylvania Constitution cannot be utilized as
a source of public policy, the Borse court turned to consider public policy
embodied in the state common law.272 Specifically, the court examined
the privacy tort of tortious invasion of privacy.2 73
The Borse court focused its analysis on the specific privacy tort of
"intrusion upon seclusion," as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, observing that "Pennsylvania recognizes a cause of action for tor-
tious 'intrusion upon seclusion' ".274 This type of invasion of privacy
"consists solely of an intentional interference with [another's] interest in
solitude or seclusion, either as to his person or as to his private affairs or
concerns, of a kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable [per-
son]."' 2 75 The Borse court envisioned two ways in which an employer's
urinalysis program might intrude upon the employee's privacy.276 First,
the court found that the particular manner in which the program is con-
ducted might violate the employee's privacy right. 2 7 7 A substantial and
highly offensive intrusion upon seclusion could result if the method
used to collect the urine sample failed to give due regard to the em-
that in interpreting this provision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has indi-
cated that Article 1 was enacted to limit the government's ability to interfere with
certain rights. Borse, 963 F.2d at 620 (citing Commonwealth v. National Gettys-
burg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588, 592 (Pa. 1973)). Therefore, the
Third Circuit predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not look to
the Pennsylvania Constitution for evidence of a public policy absent state action.
Id.
272. Borse, 963 F.2d at 620.
273. Id.
274. Id.; see Marks v. Bell Tel. Co., 331 A.2d 424, 430 (Pa. 1975) (recogniz-
ing tortious intrusion upon seclusion as part of Pennsylvania law). The Borse
court defined the tort of intrusion upon seclusion in accordance with the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 652B. Borse, 963 F.2d at 620. In a footnote, the Borse
court noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, while recognizing the tort as
set forth in the tentative draft of the Restatement, has not recognized the Restate-
ment in its final form. Id at 622 n.8. However, the Third Circuit in O'Donnell v.
United States, predicted that the Supreme Court would recognize the final draft
when given the opportunity to do so. 891 F.2d 1079, 1082 n.1 (3d Cir. 1989).
Therefore, the Borse court also interpreted Pennsylvania law as recognizing the
tort of intrusion upon seclusion. Borse, 963 F.2d at 620.
In defining the parameters of the tort, the Borse court relied upon Harris v.
Easton Publishing Co., 483 A.2d 1377 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984), where the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court stated that the "tort may occur by (1) physical intrusion
into a place where the plaintiff has secluded himself or herself; (2) use of the
defendant's senses to oversee or overhear the plaintiff's private affairs; or (3)
some other form of investigation or examination into plaintiff's private con-
cerns." Borse, 963 F.2d at 621 (quoting Harris, 483 A.2d at 1383).
275. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt (a). The Restatement de-
fines the tort as: "One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon
the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject
to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person." Id.
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ployee's privacy. 2 78 This was the basis on which the United States
Supreme Court held that the collection of urine constituted a Fourth
Amendment search under the United States Constitution.2 79 Second,
because urinalysis can reveal a number of private medical facts about an
employee, a reasonable person might consider it a highly offensive inva-
sion of his or her privacy. 280
Having determined that an employer's drug program may violate an
employee's privacy, the Borse court addressed whether "a discharge re-
lated to an employer's tortious invasion of an employee's privacy vio-
lates public policy."12 8 ' Because no Pennsylvania court had specifically
addressed the issue, the Borse court relied upon the Pennsylvania federal
district court decision in Rogers v. International Business Machines Corp.28 2
In Rogers, the plaintiff claimed that his employer violated his privacy by
investigating personal matters in which the employer had no interest. 283
The Rogers' court examined the record to determine whether the plain-
tiff's employer intruded upon his employee's seclusion.28 4 The Borse
court predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would follow the
same approach and examine the record concerning the alleged invasion
of privacy. 28 5 If the Pennsylvania Supreme Court "determined that the
discharge was related to a substantial and highly offensive invasion of
278. Id. (citing Kelley v. Schlumberger Technology Corp., 849 F.2d 41 (1st
Cir. 1988) (holding that observing employee urinating invaded employee's pri-
vacy)). First, the Borse court observed that the collection of urine "clearly impli-
cates 'expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable.' "
Id. (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617
(1989)). Next, the court recognized that many drug testing programs involve
monitoring the urine collection to ensure that the employee does not tamper
with the sample. Id. The Borse court concluded that "[mionitoring collection of
the urine sample appears to fall within the definition of an intrusion upon seclu-
sionibecause it involves the use of one's senses to oversee the private activities of
another." Id.
279. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
280. Borse, 963 F.2d at 621 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617). The court
noted that urinalysis can reveal that a person is epileptic, pregnant or diabetic.
Id. Thus, "[a] reasonable person might well conclude that submitting urine
samples to tests designed to ascertain these types of information constitutes a
substantial and highly offensive intrusion upon seclusion." Id. These types of
privacy invasions also apply to a personal property search because the search
may be conducted in a way that invades the employee's privacy by revealing
personal matters not related to the workplace. Id.
281. Id. at 621-22.
282. 500 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa. 1980). For a discussion of the Rogers deci-
sion, see supra notes 205-15 and accompanying text.
283. Rogers, 500 F. Supp. at 870.
284. Id. After examining the record, the court in Rogers found that the em-
ployer's actions were reasonable and did not intrude upon the employee's seclu-
sion. Borse, 963 F.2d at 622. Therefore, the Rogers court found no public policy
violation. Id.
285. Borse, 963 F.2d at 622. In examining the record, the court would look
at the surrounding facts and circumstances. Id. This approach appears consis-
tent with the test developed in Cisco, which emphasized the need to examine the
1568
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the employee's privacy, [the Borse court] believe[d] that [the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court] would conclude that the discharge violated
public policy."'28
6
Next, the Borse court distinguished Hershberger v. Jersey Shore Steel
Co.,287 where the Pennsylvania Superior Court refused to recognize a
public policy requiring employers to perform confirmatory tests subse-
quent to a positive result from the employee's drug test.28 8 While the
district court in Borse interpreted Hershberger as holding "sub silentio"
that no public policy existed against employee drug testing, the Third
Circuit refused to read the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision as
"foreclosing the possibility that, under some circumstances, an em-
ployer's urinalysis program may violate public policy."2 8 9 Instead, the
Borse court interpreted Hershberger's silence as to the public policy impli-
cations of employee drug testing as neither endorsing nor prohibiting a
public policy against employee drug testing.290
After concluding that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would rec-
ognize a public policy violation stemming from an employer's invasion
surrounding circumstances. Id. (citing Cisco v. United Parcel Services, Inc., 476
A.2d 1340, 1343 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)).
286. Id. The Borse court found further support for its prediction in the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Geary, where the court stated:
that there are areas of an employee's life in which his employer has no
legitimate interest. An intrusion into one of these areas by virtue of the
employer's power of discharge might plausibly give rise to a cause of
action, particularly where some recognized facet of public policy is
threatened.
Id. at 622 (quoting Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 180 (Pa.
1974)).
287. 575 A.2d 944 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). For a further discussion of Hersh-
berger, see supra notes 216-23 and accompanying text.
288. Borse, 963 F.2d at 622. The Borse court stated that:
The sole issue before the [Hershberger] court was whether a clear
mandate of public policy prohibits a private employer from discharging
an employee on the basis of a positive drug test without confirming the
results of the initial drug test by another, scientifically distinct test. As
evidence that such a public policy exists, plaintiff argued that: (1) other
states had enacted legislation requiring confirmatory testing; (2) Penn-
sylvania was then considering similar legislation; and (3) the federal
and state courts had criticized the use of unconfirmed tests.
Id.
289. Id. at 622-23. In Hershberger, the court refused to recognize a public
policy against discharge of an employer who failed a drug test without first con-
ducting a confirmatory test. 575 A.2d at 948-49. The district court in Borse read
Hershberger as implicitly holding, sub silentio, that there is no public policy in Penn-
sylvania prohibiting an employer from requiring its employees to submit to a
urinalysis. Borse, 963 F.2d at 622.
290. Borse, 963 F.2d at 622-23. The Third Circuit in Borse found that the
trial court's conclusion was not clear, and consequently viewed Hershberger differ-
ently. Id. The Borse court stated that the Hershberger court "may have elected to
dispose of the case adversely to the plaintiff on the basis of the sole question
presented without reaching the more difficult issue (the one before us now) that
appears not to have been presented." Id. at 622.
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of an employee's privacy, the Borse court surveyed decisions in other ju-
risdictions to determine what test should be applied to decide whether a
program is highly offensive to a reasonable person.291 The court noted
that of the handful of courts that have addressed the issue, the majority
balance the employer's interest in a drug free workplace against the em-
ployee's privacy interest.292 The Borse court found the balancing test to
be consistent with Pennsylvania law, because previous Pennsylvania Su-
perior Court cases establishing public policy exceptions have stressed
the need to examine the surrounding circumstances in determining
whether public policy is violated.293 Consequently, the Borse court con-
cluded that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would utilize a balancing
test to determine whether an employer's drug and alcohol policy vio-
lates the employee's right to privacy. 294 The test "balances the em-
ployee's privacy interest against the employer's interest in maintaining a
drug-free workplace in order to determine whether a reasonable person
would find the employer's program highly offensive." 295
The final issue the Borse court addressed was whether the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court would consider safety factors and individual
suspicion when applying the interest balancing test.2 9 6 The Borse court
noted that these restrictions were originally imposed upon public em-
ployers,297 and that Pennsylvania court decisions have demonstrated a
291. Id. at 623-26.
292. Id. at 623-24; see Leudtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d
1123, 1133-34 (Alaska 1989) (utilizing balancing test); Twigg v. Hercules Corp.,
406 S.E.2d 52, 55-56 (W. Va. 1990) (same); Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point
Oil Co., 609 A.2d 11, 20 (NJ. 1992) (same). The one case the Borse court ex-
amined that did not employ a balancing test was Jennings v. Minco Tech. Labs,
Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989). Injennings, the Texas Court of Ap-
peals upheld the drug testing program for several reasons. Id. at 500-02. First,
the Texas court refused to find an additional public policy exception to the very
narrow exception previously created under Texas law. Id. at 500-01. The court
also held that because the employee was required to consent before any of the
testing was completed, the employer "threaten[ed] no unlawful invasion of any
employee's privacy interest." Id. at 502.
293. Borse, 963 F.2d at 625 (citing Cisco v. United Parcel Services, Inc., 476
A.2d 1340, 1343 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)). The Borse court also noted that while
two of the three Pennsylvania cases recognizing public policy exceptions to the
employment-at-will doctrine relied partly on statutes, "the Pennsylvania courts
have also recognized other sources as competent evidence of public policy." Id
The court stated that, "[mI]ore importantly, under Pennsylvania law an em-
ployee's consent to a violation of public policy is no defense to a wrongful dis-
charge action when that consent is obtained by the threat of dismissal." Id.
(citing Leibowitz v. H.A. Winston Co., 493 A.2d 111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)). The
Borse court commented on the issue of consent to distinguish Pennsylvania law
from the Texas law used in deciding inJennings. Id.
294. Id The Borse court stated that "determining whether an alleged inva-
sion of privacy is substantial and highly offensive to the reasonable person ne-
cessitates the use of a balancing test." Id.
295. Id.
296. Id
297. Id. There is a difference between an action against a private employer
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" 'pattern of favoring the employer's interest in running its business'
and a willingness to define that interest broadly."1298 Thus, the Third
Circuit opined that while the Pennsylvania Supreme Court might in-
clude these factors in its balancing test, the supreme court would not
"require private employers to limit urinalysis programs or personal
property searches to employees suspected of drug use or to those per-
forming safety-sensitive jobs." 299
Finally, in applying the balancing test to the facts in Borse, the Third
Circuit concluded that it could not hold that Ms. Borse's discharge vio-
lated public policy because she failed to explain how the drug testing
program tortiously invaded her privacy.300 However, because the court
could conceive of two ways in which a drug testing program could tor-
tiously invade an employee's privacy, the Third Circuit remanded the
case to allow Ms. Borse leave to amend her complaint. s°i
VI. IMPACT OF BORSE AND EMPLOYER GUIDELINES
The Third Circuit's decision in Borse must be examined in the con-
text of the development of the public policy exception in Pennsylvania.
Because Pennsylvania law is controlling, the Third Circuit was required
to predict how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would decide the case if
it was before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.3 0 2 Therefore, the his-
and an action against a public/governmental employer. Id. at 625-26. Claims
against private employers are based upon the tort of invasion of privacy. Id.
This requires the court to determine whether the program was substantial and
highly offensive. Id. Claims against the public/governmental employers, on the
other hand, are based upon Fourth Amendment principles. Id. Therefore, the
Borse court concluded that "we do not believe that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court would simply transpose Fourth Amendment limitations on public employ-
ers to urinalysis programs or personal property searches conducted by private
employers." Id. at 626.
298. Id. at 626 (quoting Turner v. Letterkenny Federal Credit Union, 505
A.2d 259, 261 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)).
299. Id. at 625.
300. Id. at 626.
301. Id. For a discussion of the ways that an employer's drug testing pro-
gram could invade the employee's privacy, see supra notes 276-80 and accompa-
nying text.
302. Borse, 963 F.2d at 614. The Third Circuit noted that:
Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not addressed the ques-
tion whether discharging an at-will employee who refuses to consent to
urinalysis and to searches of his or her personal property located on the
employer's premises violates public policy, we must predict how that
court would resolve the issue should it be called upon to do so.
Id. at 613-14. Concerning the decisions by the Pennsylvania Superior Court, the
Third Circuit in Borse stated that "[a]lthough decisions by Pennsylvania's inter-
mediate appellate courts are not conclusive in predicting how the state's highest
court would decide an issue, they suggest how that court might decide and may
constitute presumptive evidence of state law in appropriate circumstances." Id.
In his statement denying rehearing en banc, Justice Hutchinson parts with
the majority in Borse on these very grounds. I& at 626-28 (ustices Greenburg
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tory of the public policy exception in Pennsylvania must be examined in
light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's views concerning the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine and the public policy exception. There are two
aspects of the court's opinion in which the Third Circuit either failed
fully to support its conclusions from the history of the public policy ex-
ception in Pennsylvania, or else failed to give sufficient guidance to em-
ployers attempting to establish drug testing programs.
The first problem with the Third Circuit's opinion in Borse is that
the court failed sufficiently to analyze and support its conclusion that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would recognize the tortious invasion of
privacy as a clear mandate of public policy.30 3 As previously mentioned,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has expressed a reluctance to disre-
gard the employment-at-will doctrine, noting that exceptions to the rule
"have been recognized in only the most limited of circumstances. °" 3 0 4
Even the Pennsylvania Superior Court has emphasized the narrowness
of the exception,3 05 the need for a clearly mandated public policy
3 0 6
and the strong interest of the employer in running his or her business as
he or she sees fit.3 0 7
As evidence of a clearly mandated public policy, the Third Circuit
relied solely upon the common-law tort of intrusion upon seclusion and
and Altino join in the dissent; Justice Nygaard would also grant rehearing). Jus-
tice Hutchinson noted that:
The [majority] concedes that the public policy on which it relies is not
expressed in either the Pennsylvania Constitution, Pennsylvania's statu-
tory law or in existing Pennsylvania Supreme Court or Superior Court
decisions concerning employment at will. This is a diversity case.
Therefore, this Court is bound by state law. Judicial notions of public
policy are no substitute for law. I am therefore unable to reconcile the
Court's opinion with the requirement that federal courts follow state
law in deciding diversity cases.
Id. at 627.
303. For a discussion of the Borse court's conclusion that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court would recognize the tortious invasion of privacy as a clear man-
date of public policy, see supra notes 281-90 and accompanying text.
304. Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications, Inc., 559 A.2d 917, 918 (Pa.
1989). For a discussion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases dealing with
the public policy exception, see supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text. Jus-
tice Hutchinson viewed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's narrow interpreta-
tion of the public policy exception to mean "that specific exceptions should be
created and defined by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania." Borse, 963 F.2d at
627.
305. For a discussion of the narrowness of the exception, see supra note 96.
306. For a discussion of the meaning of a clearly mandated public policy
and an examination of the sources of public policy, see supra notes 32-61 and
accompanying text.
307. Borse, 963 F.2d at 626. The Borse court recognized a strong employer
interest when it concluded that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not ap-
ply Fourth Amendment restrictions to private employer drug testing. Id. For a
further discussion of the stress on the employer's interests in running his or her
business, see supra note 35.
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the reasoning behind Rogers.308 Historically, however, Pennsylvania
courts have ascertained public policy exclusively from evidence "embod-
ied in a constitutionally or legislatively established prohibition, require-
ment, or privilege."5 0 9 While the Third Circuit recognized this fact, the
court simply stated that "Pennsylvania courts have also recognized other
sources as competent evidence of public policy."3 10 There is no indica-
tion that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would regard this tort as a
clearly mandated public policy, especially because it is embodied only in
the Pennsylvania common :law and not in a statute or constitution.
Given the limited acceptance of the public policy exception under Penn-
sylvania law and the fact that no Pennsylvania court has previously
looked exclusively to the common-law as evidence of public policy,3 1 1 it
is difficult to understand how the Third Circuit arrived at its conclusion.
308. 500 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa. 1980). While the Borse court recognized
the tort of invasion of privacy, the court did not explicitly rely on this tort as
evidence of the public policy. Borse, 963 F.2d at 620-26. For a discussion of the
Borse court's reasoning concerning the finding of the public policy, see notes
226-84 and accompanying text.
The difficulty with relying on the Rogers decision is that the Rogers court did
not hold that an intrusion into a private matter constituted a violation of a
clearly mandated public policy. Instead, the Rogers court examined two distinct
issues: whether the discharge was wrongful and whether the employer's actions
constituted an intrusion upon the employee's seclusion. Rogers, 500 F. Supp. at
869-70. Neither Rogers nor Borse contained any analysis of why an intrusion
upon a person's seclusion constitutes "a clear mandate of public policy" in
Pennsylvania.
While the Borse court pointed to two situations in which an employer's drug
testing program could intrude upon the employee's seclusion, the court did not
examine or weigh evidence that would point to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
accepting the tort as a clear mandate of public policy. Here again justice Hutch-
inson saw "no indication anywhere in Pennsylvania's decisional law from which a
strong policy favoring employee privacy over random drug testing could be in-
ferred in the context of employment at will." Borse, 963 F.2d at 627. Justice
Hutchinson stated that (n]o Pennsylvania court has even considered whether
an employer's tortious invasion of an employee-at-will's privacy precludes dis-
charge. The decision [in Rogers] ... relied on by the Court is not to the con-
trary." Id.
309. Smith v. Calgon Carbon Corp., 917 F.2d 1338, 1340 (3d Cir. 1990).
Thus, the Third Circuit saw little evidence that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
would find a clear mandate of public policy. Id. For a discussion of Smith, see
supra notes 186-95 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the possible
sources of public policy, see supra notes 123-54 and accompanying text.
310. Borse, 963 F.2d at 627. After examining Novosel v. Nationwide Ins.
Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983), the Borse court held that the United States
Constitution can be a source of public policy. Borse, 963 F.2d at 619. The Borse
court noted that "[allthough the Superior Court has never upheld a wrongful
discharge cause of action that depended upon a public policy stated solely in a
constitutional provision, two of its three cases upholding wrongful discharge
causes of action relied upon constitutional provisions as evidence of pubic pol-
icy." Id. at 618. However, the Third Circuit failed to spell out any other compe-
tent sources for public policy in Pennsylvania.
311. For a discussion of the sources that Pennsylvania courts have looked
to in finding a public policy, see supra notes 123-54 and accompanying text.
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The second problem with the Borse decision concerns the balancing
test the court developed to determine whether an employer's program is
highly offensive to a reasonable person.3 12 While the Borse court recog-
nized that Pennsylvania law "reflects 'a pattern of favoring the em-
ployer's interests in running its business,' and a willingness to define
that interest broadly," the court failed to properly balance this factor
against the employee's privacy interest.8 13 Hypothetically, if the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court determined that the employer's interest in
maintaining a drug free workplace was sufficiently strong, that interest
might outweigh any privacy interest the employee could assert.314 Be-
cause the Third Circuit gave little guidance in determining the exact
weight that should be given to each interest, employers are left with the
task of determining how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would weigh
each of these factors.
The Third Circuit's decision in Borse will impact any private em-
ployer who has either initiated a drug testing program or is deciding
whether to do so. Unfortunately, the Third Circuit's decision fails to
give substantial guidance to employers in developing such programs.
While it is clear that an employer's drug testing program can violate
public policy by intruding upon the seclusion of employees, it is not
clear what aspects of an employer's program could potentially meet the
"highly offensive to a reasonable person test."3 15 Despite the court's
ambiguity, however, certain guiding principles can be drawn from dicta
in Borse, as well as from similar cases.3 16
First, an employer need not limit testing to reasonable suspicion or
to employees involved in safety sensitive jobs. The Borse court opined
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will not apply these restriction to
private employees.3 17 Because these Fourth Amendment restrictions do
not apply to private employers, all employees are subject to random
312. For a discussion of the test set forth in Borse, see supra notes 291-95
and accompanying text.
313. Borse, 963 F.2d at 626 (citations omitted).
314. The Sixth Circuit arrived at this conclusion in Baggs v. Eagle-Picher
Indus., Inc., 957 F.2d 268 (6th Cir. 1992). Because state statutes strongly em-
phasized the interests of an employer, the Sixth Circuit refused to find a public
policy against drug testing based on invasion of privacy claims. Id. at 275.
Justice Hutchinson stated that "[i]ndeed, one might argue that there is a
policy in favor of a drug-free workplace that is at least as strong as the right of
privacy involved in random drug testing of private employees." Borse, 963 F.2d
at 628.
315. For a discussion of the "highly offensive to a reasonable person test,"
see supra notes 291-95 and accompanying text.
316. See, e.g., Kelley v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 849 F.2d 41 (1st Cir.
1988); Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1135 (Alaska
1989); Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989); Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil, 589 A.2d 170 (NJ. Super. 1991),
cert. granted, 598 A.2d 897, and aff'd, 609 A.2d 11 (1992) .
317. Borse, 963 F.2d at 625-26.
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drug testing regardless of the nature of their work.3 18 However, this is
not to suggest that the nature of an employees work is irrelevant. It is
conceivable that a court might look to the nature of the work in giving
weight to the employer's interest in a drug free workplace. This in turn
would affect the outcome of the balance between the employer's work-
place interest and the employee's privacy interest.
Second, when collecting the urine sample the employer should re-
frain from directly observing the collection of the sample. The method
in which the sample is collected is one area in which the Borse court indi-
cated that a program might be "highly offensive to the reasonable per-
son."3 19 Moreover, several courts and state statutes specifically require
that the employer refrain from either visual monitoring or supervised
urination.3 20 In examining the monitoring procedure utilized in Hennes-
318. In analyzing drug testing programs, several courts have stressed an
analysis of the "reason the urinalysis is conducted, and not the conduct of the
test." Luedtke, 768 P.2d at 1135; see also Hennessey, 589 A.2d 170 (N.J. Super.
1991) (citing Leudtke for examining the reason, not the conduct of urinalysis
test). The Hennessey court adopted a different approach to drug testing than
many of the other courts, stating that:
[a]lthough urine testing provides an employer with private infor-
mation, we deem the court's characterization of it ... as "a significant
interference with personal privacy and autonomy" and as a "pro-
foundly demeaning" intrusion to be overstated. Providing a urine sam-
ple is a very simple process, one that is performed thousands of times
each day in medical laboratories and doctor's offices. The fact that an-
other person of the same sex is present to prevent submission of a false
sample is not profoundly demeaning. Men urinate in the presence of
other men countless times each day in public restrooms.... The pri-
vacy interests in the physiological information which can be gleaned
from urine testing is afforded substantial protection where, as in this
case, the testing procedures are limited and specific.
Hennessey, 598 A.2d at 177. The employer's drug testing program in Hennessey
involved weekly random testing of five employees by the plant nurse. Id. at 173.
While there was a monitor in the bathroom to prevent altering the specimen, the
monitor was ordered not to look at the employee's genitalia or private parts. Id.
The urine was then tested solely for drugs and any positive result was confirmed
through an alternate method. hd
319. Borse, 963 F.2d at 621.
320. In Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989), the California court considered whether drug testing that was an employ-
ment requirement constituted an invasion of privacy under the California Con-
stitution. Id. at 202. One of the factors the court examined in upholding the
drug testing program was the fact that no one directly observed the taking of the
specimen. Id. at 204; see also Kelley v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 849 F.2d 41
(Ist Cir. 1988) (direct observation of employees urinating gave rise to invasion
of privacy action).
Connecticut's Employment Relations Law states that during the collection
of urine for an employer's drug testing program, no one is allowed to visually
watch the production of the specimen. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51w (1991). For a
survey of the state's various laws restricting drug testing in the workplace, see
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, eds., Drug Testing in the Work Place: State-by-State Drug
and Akohol Testing Survey, 33 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 189 (1991).
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sey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co. ,s21 where the monitors stood behind the
employees and "were specifically instructed 'not to look at any parts of
the employee's genitalia or private parts,' " the Borse court opined that a
reasonable person would not find this method highly offensive. 322
Third, an employer should limit the scope of the testing to those
drugs the program is designed to detect. Because urinalysis can reveal
conditions unrelated to the use of illegal drugs, the Borse court noted
that testing for conditions not consented to by employees might be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, thus violating public policy. 32 3
Restricting the types of tests that are performed will insulate an em-
ployer from this type of privacy invasion.
Finally, it would be wise for an employer to give adequate notice to
employees of the drug testing program, and to develop procedures en-
suring that results of the test remain confidential.3 24 While publicizing
employee's private information is not an element of the tort of intrusion
upon seclusion, an employer who publicizes such information may vio-
late other privacy torts, including the torts of false light privacy and un-
reasonable publicity of one's private life.325
It is relatively clear that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will con-
tinue to recognize the public policy exception. Given its groundbreak-
ing recognition of the doctrine and the sweeping acceptance the
doctrine has enjoyed in other jurisdictions, it is hard to imagine the
court taking a step backwards by refusing to recognize the doctrine.
The issue then becomes what approach the court will take in creating
additional exceptions. Because the court has previously declined to de-
velop parameters for the exception, the field is wide open for the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court. However, given the court's recent reluctance
to apply the doctrine, a sweeping application does not appear likely. Be-
cause Pennsylvania courts have historically limited the doctrine's appli-
321. 589 A.2d 170 (N.J. 1991).
322. Borse, 963 F.2d at 624 (citing Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil
Co., 589 A.2d 170, 173 (NJ. 1991)). The program in Hennessey also consisted of
limited testing for drugs only. l.
323. Id. at 621. Pregnancy, diabetes and epilepsy are just some of the con-
ditions that may be detected through testing. Id. at 623 (citing Skinner v. Rail-
way Labor Employees Association, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1413 (1989)).
324. At least one court has stressed the notice, requirement before an
employer can initiate a drug program. See Wilkinson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 199 (not-
ing that one part of program included informing applicants of testing
requirements).
325. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
While the Borse court held that a public policy violation may arise from an
employer's drug testing program, it is not at all clear from the court's opinion
whether this holding will be restricted to urinalysis or personal property
searches. Thus, the case potentially opens a door for at-will employees to bring
wrongful discharge actions based on other invasions of an employee's privacy.
The full scope of the new exception will only be seen as employees begin to
challenge their employer's drug testing programs based on invasion of privacy.
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cation to instances in which a clear mandate of public policy is embodied
in statutory and constitutional provisions, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court will likely follow such a formula.3 26
David G. Gibson
326. It is difficult to place Pennsylvania's approach to the public policy ex-
ception into any one of the categories discussed in Section II of this Note. On
the one hand, the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Field relied heavily on the
presence of a statutory duty when establishing an additional public policy excep-
tion. 565 A.2d 1170, 1180 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). This would tend to indicate
following the approach followed by the Wisconsin and Maryland courts, where a
statutory right or statutory duty is a prerequisite to a wrongful discharge action.
On the other hand, Pennsylvania Superior Court cases have also indicated the
need for a balancing test when approaching the doctrine, balancing the em-
ployer's workplace interests against the asserted public policy. See Yaindl v. In-
gersoll-Rand Co. Standard Pump-Aldrich Div., 422 A.2d 611 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1980). Consequently, some approach encompassing both is probably required.
The best approach seems to be one which follows the four step analysis set forth
by Professor Perritt in Section II of this Note. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in utilizing this approach will most likely restrict the sources of public policy to
solely statutory or a combination of statutory and constitutional mandates of
public policy. For a discussion of the varied approaches to analyzing the public
policy exception, see supra notes 32-61 and accompanying text.
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